Notice to Judge

            IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY, MISSOURI
                         FAMILY COURT DIVISION

In Re the Marriage of:               )
VICKI LORRAINE PERKEL and            )
MARC PERKEL                          )
                                     )
                                     )
VICKI LORRAINE PERKEL,               )
Petitioner,                          )  Case No. 194DR3198
                                     )
vs.                                  )
                                     )
MARC PERKEL                          )
Respondent,                          )


                                NOTICE
                                ======

COMES NOW, Respondent Marc Perkel and gives notice to Judge Paul McGhee
that he doesn't have the authority to grant Petitioners Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order. This notice is not to be construed to
indicate that Judge McGhee has any authority to grant Petitioner an
injunction or temporary restraining order.


1) That on July 31st 1996 the judgement was made. Motions for
   reconsideration and/or new trial was made and those motions were
   denied on November 18th 1996 when the judgement became final. After
   this Respondent made motions for modification of the final judgement
   and they were denied on the basis that the judgement was final and
   that the Judge no longer had the authority to make modifications.


2) This case is now in appeal and is before the Missouri Court of
   Appeals Southern District (case #21362-1).


3) Respondent has also filed a suit against Petitioner and Petitioner's
   attorneys in an independent action in equity for Fraud on the Court
   in Greene County Circuit Court (case #197CC0170). Therefore, if the
   Petitioner had a cause to request a Temporary Restraining Order, she
   has file her request in the wrong court.


   After enrollent of final judgement this court became divested of
   jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Petitioner did
   nothing to revest jurisdiction and that Petitioner should be directed
   to take there cause to the court where Respondent's independant
   action in equitity is pending. Respondent contends that the
   Petitioner has the burden to establish jurisdiction.


4) Even if Judge McGhee had the authority to grant Petitioner's motion it
   would be wrong to do so because Petitioner hasn't met the
   requirements set forth in the rules for the granting of a Temporary
   Restraining Order for the following reasons:


      a) Although Petitioner claims irreparable injury, this injury
         isn't immediate if it exists at all. Since this property is the
         subject of two other actions and Respondent has filed a Notice
         of Lis Penens on the deed, Petitioner isn't going to be able to
         sell the property anyway. In order to be granted an ex-parte
         Temporary Restraining Order, the Petitioner is required by Rule
         92.02 (b)(2) to:


            "the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing
            the efforts, if any, that have been made to give notice and
            the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be
            required."


         This is missing from Petitioner's motion and therefore
         Petitioner's motion is incomplete.


         Neither Petitioner nor her attorneys have contacted the
         Respondent over this issue.


      b) If anyone is entitled to an injunction, it would be the
         Respondent. The Respondent doesn't want to sell this property
         and preventing it's sale while these two suits are pending
         preserves the status quo. Should the Petitioner sell the
         property and the judgement be overturned it would be the
         Respondent, not the Petitioner, who would suffer irreparable
         harm.


      c) The Petitioner is attempting to execute a judgement obtained by
         fraud on the court. The fraud is clearly documented in the
         court record and it is likely that the judgement will be
         overturned.


5) Respondent is still investigating the circumstances which allowed the
   Petitioner to claim ownership of the property in question. Respondent
   doesn't understand, and request that the Judge explain to him, how it
   is that the Judge allowed Petitioner's attorney's to take possession
   and transfer the deed to the property in question BEFORE THE DATE OF
   FINAL JUDGEMENT.


   Petitioner's attorney's Wear and Sharp moved to transfer ownership of
   this property on September 25th 1996 according to the Recorder of
   Deeds. This date was after Respondent had filed his Motion for
   Reconsideration and/or New Trial and before the October 29th hearing
   and before final judgement was entered on November 18th 1996.


   Respondent is confused as to why the Judge allowed Petitioner's
   attorneys, if the Judge was aware of it, to transfer title before a
   final decision was made. It would seem to the Respondent that for the
   judge to allow this to occur implies that the Judge had already made
   a final decision and communicated his final decision to the
   Petitioner's attorneys before September 25th 1996. Respondent would
   like an explanation from the Judge how it is possible to do this.


   It would seem reasonable to assume that Wear and Sharp could not have
   transferred title to this property on September 25th 1996 unless they
   already knew beforehand how the final judgement, entered on November
   18 1996 was going to be decided. Respondent contends that either Mr.
   Wear and Mr. Sharp or the Judge should explain how this could happen.


   It would seem to the Respondent that if Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp acted
   to transfer title of said property without the Judges knowledge
   and/or consent, that the Judge should file a bar complaint against
   Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp because this relects badly on the judicial
   system itself and brings the integrity of Mr. McGhee as well as the
   integrity of this court into question.


6) Respondent contends that the title, if it has been transferred, was
   improperly transferred for the following reasons:


      a) It was transferred before the judgement was final.


      b) There is no judgement because of fraud on the court.


      c) The judgement states that the parties are to "execute such
         titles or other documents as may be necessary to effectuate the
         division of the property as aforesaid." Neither party has even
         asked the other party to execute any titles. The Respondent has
         signed nothing giving up his claim in the disputed property.
         The Respondents home is still collateral on this property in
         spite of the order of the court that the Petitioner take over
         the loan and remove this lien.


WHEREFORE, Respondent Marc Perkel gives NOTICE that Judge McGhee does
not have the authority to grant Petitioners order, nor would it be
appropriate to do so if he did.

Respondent prays for an explanation as to the circumstances allowing the
Petitioner to take title to the property in question while a decision
was still pending. That the Judge order Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp to
explain to the Court and to the Respondent what athority allows them to
transfer title before the judgement is final.



_____________________________________
Marc Perkel * Respondent * 03-07-97

Attachment:

Plaintiff's Independent Action in Equity
Plaintiff's Brief