Writ of Prohibition

                   IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
                           SOUTHERN DISTRICT

                                 )
Marc Perkel                      )  Greene County Case: 194DR3198
             Appellant,          )
                                 )  Appeal No: 21362-1
vs.                              )
                                 )
Vicki Lorraine Stringfellow      )
             Respondent,         )


       MOTION TO DECIDE JURISDICTION AND FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
       =========================================================


COMES NOW, Appellant Marc Perkel to ask the Court of Appeals to make a
ruling as to which court has jurisdiction. The Respondent is attempting
to revest jurisdiction with the trial court (Greene County Case
#194DR3198) in order to get a Temporary Restraining Order. Appellant
contends that this case is closed and that the Appellate Court
(Appellate Case 21362-1) and/or the Greene County Circuit Court (Case
#197CC0170) are the proper courts to hear this motion. In support of his
motion Appellant states as follows:


1) On July 31st 1996 the judgement was made in the Divorce of Marc
   Perkel and Vicki Stringfellow. Motions for reconsideration and/or new
   trial was made and those motions were denied on November 18th 1996
   when the judgement became final. Appellant then filed his notice of
   appeal and ordered the trial record to be transcribed. The Appellant
   made motions for modification of the final judgement. In response
   Judge McGhee made a finding that he didn't have the authority to make
   modifications to the decree.


2) This case is now in appeal and is before the Missouri Court of
   Appeals Southern District (case #21362-1).


3) Appellant has also filed a suit against the Respondent, Vicki
   Stringfellow, and Respondents's attorneys, William A. Wear and James
   R. Sharp, in an independent action in equity pursuant to Rule 74.06
   for Fraud on the Court and/or Conspiracy to Defraud the Court in
   Greene County Circuit Court (case #197CC0170).


4) Rule 75.01 "Control of Judgement" states in the relevant part:


      "After the filing of notice of appeal and before the filing of the
      record on appeal in the appellate court, the trial court, after
      the expiration of such thirty day period, may still vacate, amend,
      or modify it's judgement upon stipulation of the parties
      accompanied by a withdraw of the appeal."


5) The parties have not stipulated and the appeal is not withdrawn.
   Therefore the criteria for Rule 75.01 is not met and the trial court
   loses control upon enrollment of judgement.


6) After enrollment of final judgement the trial court became divested of
   jurisdiction over the Appellant's person. No action was taken to
   revest jurisdiction and the Respondent should be directed to take her
   cause to the court where the independent action in equity is
   pending or to the Court of Appeals. Appellant contends that the
   Respondent has the burden to establish jurisdiction if she intends to
   switch courts.


7) Judge McGhee was appointed as a special judge for the divorce case
   only. He is not a member of the Greene County Circuit Court. The case
   for which he was appointed special judge is concluded.


8) Black Law Dictionary Sixth Edition id 842 defines a Writ of
   Prohibition as follows:


      "Prohibition is a process by which a superior court prevents an
      inferior court or tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial
      powers from exceeding it's jurisdiction in matters over which it
      has cognizance or usurping matters not within it's jurisdiction to
      hear or determine. A means of restraint on judicial personnel or
      bodies to prevent usurpation of judicial power, and it's essential
      function is to confine inferior courts to their proper
      jurisdiction and to prevent them from acting without or in excess
      of their jurisdiction; it is preventive in nature rather than
      corrective."


9) Should this Court of Appeals rule it has jurisdiction and the trial
   court does not it would be appropriate for this court to issue a Writ
   of Prohibition preventing the trial judge from exceeding his judicial
   authority or, in this case, acting in the absence of all judicial
   authority.


10) Respondent's attorneys, William A. Wear and James R. Sharp are
    licensed attorneys who have practiced law for years. They should
    know what the rules are and know what court has jurisdiction. A pro
    se litigant, such as myself, should not have the burden of having to
    instruct these seasoned lawyers as to what court has jurisdiction.


    In addition to that, Appellant has been noticed to appear at a
    hearing on March 31st 1997 for his motion for a Temporary
    Restraining Order. A TRO is by definition an ex-parte proceeding as
    defined by Rule 92.02(b) and is only good for 10 days. Are
    Respondent's attorneys really asking for a preliminary injunction?
    If they are shouldn't their motion be for that instead of a TRO?
    I don't know where these lawyers went to law school but they don't
    seem to know what they are doing. Anyone who reads Rule 92 can
    clearly see that either these attorneys didn't read the Rules or
    they're using the court to harass the Appellant.


    Appellant therefore contends that Respondent's attorneys have filed
    a frivolous motion pursuant to Rules 3.1 and 55.03(b) and should be
    sanctioned and that they should reimburse the Appellant $750 for his
    time and expenses.


11) Appellant is confused as to the motives of Judge McGhee as to why he
    agreed to hear the motion after being clearly notified that he does
    not have jurisdiction. This same judge has already ruled to give
    Appellant's ex-wife a sum of money that exceeded Appellants net
    assets. (Which the Respondent now admits to in her "Suggestions in
    Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Stay Appeal.) And this judge
    refused to even give the Appellant a payment schedule to pay this
    impossible sum of money. This judge appears to more than willing to
    exceed his jurisdiction as an advocate of the Respondent and her
    attorneys.


    Because of the unusual behavior of Judge McGhee in going out of his
    way to hear Respondent's motions while refusing to hear any motions
    of the Appellant, and noting this judge's willingness to exceed his
    judicial authority and usurp the power of the Appellate Court even
    after notification thereof, the Appellant is concerned that there
    exists an improper relationship between the Respondent's attorneys
    and the judge.


12) The Appellant is conducting himself in a professional manner and is
    playing by the rules. Appellant asks the court to uphold the rules
    and enforce the rules. That it is fundamentally unfair for the
    Respondents attorneys to be allowed to break the rules and subvert
    the administration of justice.


WHEREFORE, Appellant asks the court to decide which courts do and do not
have jurisdiction and where appropriate to issue writs of prohibition
restricting courts with no jurisdiction from usurping the power of the
Appellate Court and to issue sanction against Respondent's attorneys as
it deems appropriate.



_____________________________________
Marc Perkel * Respondent * 03-28-97

Attached:

 Respondent's motion for TRO.
 Appellant's responsive notice.