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In the United States District Court for
For the Western District of Missouri
Southern Division
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Marc Perkel, Plaintiff,
Vs
James R. Sharp, William A. Wear Jr. The law firm of Wear and Sharp LLC. Vicki L. Stringfellow, Donald R. Duncan, The law firm of Turner, Reid, Duncan, Loomer, and Patton, P.C., The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Co.,
Defendants, |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
Case No: 98-3040-CV-S-3 |
Plaintiff's Response to April 15th Order of the Court
On April 15th 1998 this court issued an order. In this order the court decided to construe all motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgement. Plaintiff has challenged these motions to dismiss on the basis that defendants can not represent defendants. Plaintiff contends that all the motions to dismiss were improperly filed by counsel who are prohibited from entering an appearance in behalf of their defendants. If the counsel is improper, then this court doesn't have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motions of these defendants. Thus this court can not construe their motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgement without first finding that defendants can represent defendants. The Plaintiff therefore demands that this court make a finding of fact that the defendants are properly represented by counsel. Plaintiff acknowledges that this court can dismiss the case sua sponte.
Since the Court seems to have found the Plaintiff's pleading lacking, the Plaintiff will assume leave of the Court to amend his Pleading. The new pleading fixes the issue of not having pleaded sufficient facts to allege conspiracy and addresses all the points raised by the defendants.
In order to establish a cause of action for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support the following elements: 1) two or more persons; 2) an object to be accomplished; 3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; 4) one or more unlawful acts; and, 5) damages. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Weber, 767 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo.App. 1989); Mackey v. Mackey, 914 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo.App. 1996). The term unlawful, as it relates to civil conspiracy, is not limited to conduct that is criminally liable.
Civil rights complaints under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 require that the defendant acted under color of law. Normally you can sue a private party for violations of civil rights. A plaintiff must prove that the defendants deprived him of a constitutional right under color of state law. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & co. 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970) it was held:
"Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of the statute. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents," United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)."
However, you can sue a private person under civil rights laws if the private person was jointly engaged with the public official in the challenged action (Dennis v. Sparks 449 US 24, 101 S Ct 183 (1980)). The Plaintiff must establish that the defendants were a "willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents". In this case Plaintiff is alleging that the Defendants conspired with the judge, and that the judge acted in behalf of the Defendants to deprive the Plaintiff of his property and due process rights under the 14th Amendment. The Plaintiff has alleged facts that indicate that there was a "meeting of the minds" between the judges and the defendant attorneys. Manis v. Sterling 862 F.2d 679, 681 (8th Cir. 1988). The Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts to support the allegation of conspiracy. Thus the Plaintiff has met the burden required in order to bring a 1983 action against private parties.
In this case we have two judges and the assistant to the attorney general. All three of these people are state actors and were acting in their official capacity under color of state law.
In Mark v. Furay 769 F.2d 1266 the standard of review for pleading conspiracy is as follows:
First, Mark's allegations concerning the existence of the conspiracy itself are sufficiently specific to avoid dismissal. Indeed, the district court, which had earlier granted a motion to dismiss Mark's original complaint with leave to amend because of inadequate conspiracy allegations, did not dismiss the present complaint for insufficient allegations of the conspiracy itself. Second, Mark has specifically charged, as in the critical paragraph of the complaint quoted above, that the defendants conspired with and actually directed Furay and Kooyenga to cause a felony theft warrant to be issued and served against Mark, notwithstanding the knowledge of all the conspirators that the charge was false. Thus, this is not a case where the plaintiff has alleged only that private parties provided false information to an arresting officer, see Moore, 754 F.2d at 1352, but rather is a case where the plaintiff has alleged that the arresting officers already knew that information was fa lse and nevertheless conspired with the private parties to have the plaintiff arrested. Third, Furay and Kooyenga's actions relative to the theft arrest must be considered to have occurred under color of law, since their actions were made possible because of their authority as law enforcement officers to investigate crimes and make arrests. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 81 S. Ct. 473 ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law.") (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 85 L. Ed. 1368, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941)), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978); A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 676 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1982) (allegations that sheriff conspired with private parties to pu t the plaintiffs out of business by serving summonses, complaints, and garnishments that the defendants knew to be invalid state a claim under section 1983).
In this case we have a lot of color of state law. Judge Syler, knowing that Mr. Sharp was going to be a witness and that it was improper for him to allow defendants to represent defendants, did it anyway in furtherance of the conspiracy. When the Plaintiff uncovered that Mr. Sharp had committed misdemeanors and felonies, Judge Syler shut down discovery in order to protect the defendants from being criminally charged.
Judge Syler refused to recuse himself when it was clear he had a duty to do so. In fact, in order to keep from being recused, Judge Syler conspired with Judge Hanna to make sure he didn't get recused. Judge Hanna had a duty to recuse Judge Syler whether or not the Plaintiff made a motion or if it was in proper form. Judge Hanna refused to let the Plaintiff question Judge Syler as a witness when the Plaintiff had a right to do so. Judge Hanna lied to the Plaintiff on the record when he pretended he didn't know that Judge Syler was in the courthouse. Judge Hanna denied the Plaintiff due process of law by failing to allow the Plaintiff to call Judge Syler and falsely indicating that the Plaintiff had to subpoena Judge Syler in order to call him as a witness.
Assistant Attorney General Laura Vogal had no right and no standing to make an appearance in the state court case. Ms. Vogal claimed to be speaking as a "Friend of the Court" when she was in fact acting as an attorney for Judge Syler. In her capacity as lawyer she made arguments in behalf of Judge Syler as to why he shouldn't have to testify. She indicated that she could produce Judge Syler for the Court but failed to do so when the Plaintiff called Judge Syler to the stand. What gives the Office of the Attorney General the right to interfere with my right to due process of law in my state lawsuit for fraud? She is supposed to be speaking for the interests of the State of Missouri. It would appear that the State of Missouri is taking sides with the Defendants in my state lawsuit. Missouri is protecting the interests of these crooked lawyers and The Bar Plan from my right to sue them for fraud.
From what I understand, The Bar Plan is somewhat of a lawyers cooperative for buying cheap malpractice insurance. The Bar Plan insures most, if not all of the lawyers in Missouri that carry malpractice insurance. If someone like me, a pro se litigant, were to win against The Bar Plan, it would raise the cost of malpractice insurance for every lawyer in the state. Most judges are not judges for life and know that they will likely practice law privately at some point in the future. Therefore, Judge Syler and Judge Hanna have an interest in making sure that someone like me doesn't start winning lawsuits against lawyers on the basis of fraud on the court. Although fraud is prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct and the law, it turns out that the Missouri Rules of Court are no more than a prop and are in fact not the real rules that the court goes by.
The real rules are that lawyers and judges cover for each other and break the rules with impunity because they can get away with it. Because the judicial system is self governing, there really is no enforcement of the rules. These lawyers and judges know that they can get away with anything and they don't hardly pretend to follow the rules. The judicial system is a sick sorry joke and it makes me ashamed to call myself an American. It makes me want to burn the flag. Attached is the transcript of Judge Hanna's and Judge Syler's kangaroo court. Read it yourself and you tell me this isn't a conspiracy to deprive me of my right to due process of law!
Liability
All the conspirators acting in furtherance of the conspiracy are all liable for the acts of the other conspirators. Thus Ms. Stringfellow and The Bar Plan, even if they had no contact directly with any of the state actors, acted in furtherance of the conspiracy and is liable for the acts of her lawyers who did act directly with the judges under color of state law.
Hoffman v. Halden 268 F.2d 280 (1959)
If sufficient allegations appear of the acts of one defendant among the conspirators, causing damage to plaintiff, and the act of the particular defendant was done pursuant to the conspiracy, during its course, in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy, with the requisite purpose and intent and under color of state law, then all defendants are liable for the acts of the particular defendant under the general principle of agency on which conspiracy is based.
Evidence of a Conspiracy
All the evidence the Plaintiff has of a conspiracy is in the amended pleading. The Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to have discovery. In the case of Sparkman v. McFarland 601 F.2d 261 (1979) the court held that a case can not be thrown out for lack of evidence without the Plaintiff being given the opportunity to have discovery. Plaintiff attaches the transcript of his April 17th 1998 hearing as evidence of a conspiracy.
In many cases of conspiracy essential information can only be produced through discovery, and the parties should not be thrown out of court before being given an opportunity through that process to ascertain whether the linkage they think may exist actually does.
Sparkman v. McFarland goes on to say that all the Plaintiff has to do is sufficiently allege circumstantial evidence.
It should be remembered that under the substantive law of civil conspiracy, "circumstantial evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy"; a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of an explicit agreement between the conspirators to prove his case. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741-42 (7th Cir. 1969). If the plurality's conception of "some factual allegations suggesting such a "meeting of the minds' " is simply the allegation of circumstantial evidence from which, if taken as true, a conspiracy could be inferred, the plurality's pleading requirement, although requiring a high degree of factual particularity, comports with substantive conspiracy law. And it would be incongruous, of course, to require evidence in the pleadings that is unnecessary for success on the merits.
Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (1979)
A civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties "to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,' and "an overt act that results in damage.' " Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted). In order to prove the existence of a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff is not required to provide direct evidence of the agreement between the conspirators; "circumstantial evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy." Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741-42 (7th Cir. 1969). Absent the testimony of a coconspirator, it is unlikely that direct evidence of a conspiratorial agreement will exist. Thus, the question whether an agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in a civil conspir acy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can "infer from the circumstances (that the alleged conspirators) had a "meeting of the minds' and thus reached an understanding" to achieve the conspiracy's objectives. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).
A plaintiff seeking redress need not prove that each participant in a conspiracy knew the "exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all participants therein." Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., supra, 447 F.2d at 875. An express agreement among all the conspirators is not a necessary element of a civil conspiracy. The participants in the conspiracy must share the general conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the objective or possess the same motives for desiring the intended conspiratorial result. To demonstrate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, it simply must be shown that there was "a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which (was) known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences." Id.
Res Adjudicata / Collateral Estoppel
Plaintiff admits that he has been beaten by some of the defendants in other court actions and has had other courts ignore the Plaintiff. However, these cases are completely unrelated to this case and there are no issues before this court that were decided in any other court. The issues before this court didn't exist in those other cases.
Plaintiff wishes to point out that the Missouri Court of Appeals, The Missouri Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court decided not to rule on the issue of defendants representing defendants. They didn't rule in favor of Judge Syler's position. Since Judge Syler ordered certification of the question and the higher courts refused to certify it, it would appear that the higher courts refused to support Judge Syler's ruling.
Defendant Stringfellow's Motion to Dismiss
In defendant Stringfellow's motion to dismiss Plaintiff admits that she is a private party. Plaintiff does not need to allege that she conspired directly with a state actor. Plaintiff has alleged that she was part of a conspiracy that involved state actors who had a common purpose. Plaintiff alleged that she hired her lawyers to conspire for her and had knowledge that her lawyers were acting illegally in her behalf.
Defendant Stringfellow claims collateral estoppel based on case number 96-3383-CV-AE. This case is wholly unrelated to that case. That case was a suit over the divorce case. That suit was dismissed as a non-suit. The defendants didn't get a judgement in their favor, just a dismissal.
This suit has nothing to do with the divorce. This suit is about fraudulent and criminal conduct that occurred after that other suit was dismissed.
Plaintiff has pleaded that he is a member of a class and that he was abused on the basis of being a member of that class. Class based animus is required for a 1985(3) claim, but not a 1985(2) claim as explained to the Plaintiff's brief. (Britt v. Suckle, (1978) 453 F Supp 987)
Conspiracy / Meeting of the Minds / Standard of Review
The Plaintiff does not have to allege in detail everything about conspiracy in his pleading as long as he has given the defendants "fair notice" which he has done in his brief. The landmark case on "notice pleading" is Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) which states:
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. Following the simple guide of Rule 8 (f) that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substan tial justice," we have no doubt that petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. Cf. Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197.
On a motion to dismiss the court will construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true. (Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997). The court will not grant the motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim[s] which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson.
Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states:
A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint alleging violations of civil rights must read the complaint's allegations expansively, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972). Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." onner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)).
Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion to dismiss, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom. That means if this court can figure out a legal theory that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of, this court must deny a motion to dismiss on the court's legal theory. And considering that the Plaintiff is suing lawyers and judges who are part of the "brotherhood", this court has an obligation to try hard to come up with that legal theory to avoid the appearance of bias.
Plaintiff need not allege personal involvement by all the parties. When a person is part of a conspiracy, one does not require a hub and spoke form. One need only be part of a chain of conspirators. Ms. Stringfellow need not have had personal contact with Judge Syler nor had a meeting of the minds with Judge Syler herself. Ms. Stringfellow employed Mr. Sharp as her agent who did the dirty work in her behalf with her full knowledge and approval. Likewise, The Bar Plan is fully liable under the allegation that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, who represented them did violate the laws with The Bar Plan's full knowledge and approval. So even if Respondent Superior fails, The Bar Plan was an active participant in the conspiracy.
A similar example would be a "murder for hire" plot. If Sally hires Dick to kill Jane, Sally is guilty of murder even though she wasn't there and never touched the gun. Even if neither Ms. Stringfellow nor The Bar Plan conspired with Judge Syler to obstruct justice. They hired Mr. Sharp and Mr. Duncan to conspire to obstruct justice for them.
Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states:
A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint alleging violations of civil rights must read the complaint's allegations expansively, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972). Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." onner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)).
Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgement, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom. Thus is there is any possible theory that would entitle the Plaintiff to relief, even one that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of, the court can not dismiss this case.
Plaintiff is disturbed by this courts willingness to allow the motions of defendants representing defendants to be considered. The court deciding to construe defendants motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgement further disturbs the Plaintiff. Should this court rule summarily, it would deny the Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his pleading and deny the Plaintiff his day in court. This court's ruling on April 15th has the appearance that this court is acting in favor of the Defendants and to deny the Plaintiff his day in court.
The Plaintiff reminds this court that these charges, if proved true, are very serious and that this court has a duty to the Constitution to protect the integrity of the courts. Plaintiff reminds this court that is loyalties are to the People of the United States and not to the self interests of the Bar, or fellow judges, or to The Bar Plan. The Plaintiff appreciates that it is difficult for a judge to rule against his fellow judge buddies. Plaintiff believes that it is unconstitutional for the judicial system to be self regulating and that this case is evidence as to why self regulation doesn't work. But since the judiciary jealously defends self regulation, then it has a duty to self regulate. Therefore, this court, which has a prima facia conflict of interest, has a duty to construe this pro se lawsuit very liberally in order to protect the public perception of the integrity of this court.
The judicial system is self-governing and is therefore responsible for policing itself. The preamble makes this responsibility clear by stating: "The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves."
The United States is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The judicial system’s function is to serve the public by providing a means to serve justice and to resolve disputes. This can only be done in an environment where honesty, integrity, and high moral standards are strictly enforced. The Supreme Court uses disciplinary proceedings to protect the court and public from the official ministrations of lawyers unfit to practice law.
Bad lawyers hurt good lawyers. When a lawyer is allowed to abuse the judicial process for his own personal gain it taints the image of the court and that of all lawyers. As officers of the court, lawyers should be held to a higher standard of honesty and moral character, not a lower standard. It is therefore in the best interest of all lawyers to weed out those who willfully break the rules and are therefore unfit to practice law. Any organization that fails to take responsibility to police itself will eventually lose its autonomy. If the courts allow lawyers to use the court’s power to abuse the people, the people will rise up against the courts and strip them of their authority.
It's the actions of lawyers like Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp who bring the lawyers into disrepute. Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp are a pariah on society and the legal system. They make a living feeding off the misfortune of others and taking advantage of the lax enforcement of ethical standards to use the courts as an opportunity to steal from the public. It lawyers like these who cause people like me to hate the judicial system because it makes all lawyers look like a bunch of self serving crooks. These lawyers should not be allowed to get away with it. These lawyers should not be allowed to continue to practice law.
These lawyers have shown an absolute disdain for ethics, honesty, and the Rules of Professional Conduct. To them these rules are a joke. Their conduct was willful, deliberate and inexcusable. But what’s worse is when judges conspire with lawyers to cover up for each other as they abuse justice to rip off the public who they are supposed to serve. Lawyers become judges and judges go back to being lawyers and it would seem that the rule of law has less to do with justice that it has to do with the old idiom, "you have to go along to get along". And that’s clearly what happened in this case.
In this case the Plaintiff served the Judge and Defendant Sharp with notification that Mr. Sharp would be deposed. A defendant is automatically, by law, a witness, and both Judge Syler and Mr. Sharp know it. When Judge Syler asked the question if Mr. Sharp was going to be a witness, he did so with the expectation that Mr. Sharp would say the lie he expected to hear. In this case we have Judge Syler hiding out in a back room of the courthouse avoiding being called to the stand while his fellow judge lies to the court about his whereabouts and lies about the rule of law. In this case we also have the Office of the Attorney General who falsely claims to be a friend of the court when she is in fact acting as counsel for Judge Syler taking and interest in my state case to protect crooked lawyers and allow them to get away with crimes and help hide a judge who knows that the rules require his recusal. The Attorney General should be investigating these lawyers for conspiracy to obstruct justice, perjury, filing a false affidavit, tampering with physical evidence. The State should be representing the people to protect the public from the criminal conduct of lawyers. Not only have they failed to do that, but now the Attorney General's office has conspired with these lawyers and judges to cover up criminal conduct.
Is this the way the justice system is meant to be run? Are our courts run by laws or by winks and nods? It would appear that winks and nods run Mr. Syler’s court. If you’re an insider, you win. If you’re an outsider, you lose. Justice is no more than a brand name that’s used as a marketing ploy to pacify the citizens so as to create the illusion of justice.
In the case of ELKINS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 the court in speaking about the imperative of judicial integrity stated:
"In a government of laws," said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
This court has a duty to the constitution to take an active role in making sure that this sort of corruption is not allowed to continue. The integrity of justice is at stake here and the Plaintiff hopes that this court will stand on the side of the law and not become part of the coverup. If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem. Judge Clark, are you going to rule according to the law or are you going to cover up for these judges and lawyers? That's the real question before this court!
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Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 05-14-98
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