In the United States District Court for

For the Western District of Missouri

Southern Division

 

Marc Perkel,

Plaintiff,

 

Vs

 

James R. Sharp,

William A. Wear Jr.

The law firm of Wear and Sharp LLC.

Vicki L. Stringfellow,

Donald R. Duncan,

The law firm of Turner, Reid, Duncan, Loomer, and Patton, P.C.,

The Honorable William L. Syler,

The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Co.,

 

Defendants,

 

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Case No: 98-3040-CV-S-3

 

Motion to Disqualify Counsel

COMES NOW Plaintiff Marc Perkel, to ask that this court prohibit Defendants Wear and Sharp and the law firm of Wear and Sharp from representing Defendant Vicki Stringfellow. A defendant in a lawsuit can not act as an attorney for another defendant. The Plaintiff has made his arguments as to why this is so in his brief he filed with his pleading. This issue is one of the subjects of this suit.

Plaintiff contends that Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear are attempting to obstruct justice. Apparently Mr. Sharp is betting 25 million dollars of his client's money that this court is going to break its own rules of conflict of interest in order to help him get away with criminal activity. As they did in the state court action, Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp are trying to tamper with the administration of justice.

On February 2nd 1998, Plaintiff served all the defendants by mail and included a "Notice and Acknowledgement by Mail" form for each defendant to fill out and return within the 20 day period. All the defendants, except Ms. Stringfellow, returned the form in a timely manner. Mr. Sharp's form (attached) indicated that he was representing himself pro se and his law firm, but failed to indicate that he was also representing Ms. Stringfellow. Plaintiff is confused as to why Mr. Sharp failed to reveal that he was representing Ms. Stringfellow on his form. If Mr. Sharp is to represent Ms. Stringfellow, then he is responsible for returning the form in a timely manner. Plaintiff feels that Mr. Sharp should explain to this court why he concealed his representation of Ms. Stringfellow.

On February 27th 1998, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice, the Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Sharp and Ms. Stringfellow (attached) inquiring about why Ms. Stringfellow failed to make an appearance. Mr. Sharp responded (attached) indicating that he was indeed going to represent his co-defendant Ms. Stringfellow.

Mr. Sharp argues in his letter that the non-rulings of the three higher courts indicate a ruling in his favor. Judge Syler, who did make a ruling in his favor, is now a defendant in this action for doing so. The Plaintiff contends that the non-rulings of the higher courts only indicate that the procedure that Judge Syler initiated for certifying a question of law was faulty and produced no results. Mr. Sharp has no basis to conclude that the non-ruling of the higher courts is a ruling that a defendant is allowed to represent another defendant.

In the case of Ford v. Temple Hospital, 790 F.2d 342, it was decided that:

The federal cost statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, further enabled the courts to impose sanctions for attorney misconduct, but the power to assess costs on an attorney in a given case is a power which "courts should exercise only in instances of a serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice." Overnite Transportation Co. v. Chicago Industrial Tire Co., 697 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908, 89 S. Ct. 1750, 23 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1969). Thus, before attorneys' fees and costs may be imposed under section 1927, there must be a finding of willful bad faith on the part of the offending attorney. Baker Industries, Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd. 764 F.2d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 1985).

In the case of Thomas Trulis; Eamon J. V. J. Porter Barton, 1997.C09.121 the court reversed a decision of the lower court for abuse of discretion for NOT imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct. The court concluded:

Although the sanctions in this case are payable to the Berg Defendants, the real cost of Benice's misconduct, and of most attorney misconduct, is borne by the clients and the legal profession as a whole. At a time when public confidence in the legal profession has already been severely eroded, courts cannot further jeopardize that confidence by condoning such egregious and pervasive attorney misconduct. The district court, in considering sanctions, should also determine whether reference of any of the lawyers involved to the appropriate disciplinary authorities is warranted.

Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear are lawyers. They have practiced law for many years, they went to law school and passed the Bar Examination. The Plaintiff has to believe that some where they were taught about conflict of interest and Plaintiff contends that these lawyers know better than to try to pull this kind of stunt on the federal courts. Plaintiff contends that these lawyers are acting in bad faith and are therefore subject to sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

In the case of ELKINS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 the court in speaking about the imperative of judicial integrity stated:

"In a government of laws," said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."

The Plaintiff contends that this court has a duty to obey its own rules and prohibit conflicts of interest and prevent this case from becoming a circus. By representing his co-defendant, Ms. Stringfellow, Mr. Sharp hopes to use Attorney/Client privilege to shield him from discovery. It also puts his client, Ms. Stringfellow in the awkward position of having to testify against her lawyers. How is the Plaintiff going to conduct discovery under these circumstances? How can the results of a trial be relied on when a lawyer, who is trying to save his own skin, represents a client? Is this court going to allow these lawyers make a mockery of the federal judicial system?

The Plaintiff has made extensive arguments on this subject in his brief he filed with his pleading in this case under the section of Defendants representing Defendants. Plaintiff refers this court to those arguments rather than repeating himself here.

 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the court will:

  1. Make a finding of willful bad faith on the part of Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear by first concealing their representation of Ms. Stringfellow from the Plaintiff and then to obstruct justice by entering an appearance to represent their co-defendant, Ms. Stringfellow, and;
  2. Issue an immediate order to prohibit Defendant Sharp and Defendant Wear and their law firm from representing Defendant Stringfellow and sanction them for attempting to do so.
  3. If a hearing is necessary, Plaintiff asks for an immediate hearing to resolve all issues of representation.

 

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Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 03-02-98

 

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