COMES NOW Plaintiff Marc Perkel, to ask this court for a fair trial and to play by the rules, obey the laws of the United States, and make rulings consistent with case law. Although the Plaintiff is pro se, he should not be held to a higher standard than a lawyer should and a pro se litigant is entitled to the same justice as people who are represented by attorneys. Plaintiff asks this court to refrain from breaking the rules by allowing defendants to appear with improper counsel and to refrain from considering motions filed by improper counsel. Plaintiff recognizes that the courts are self regulating and that this court can get away with doing just about anything it wants to. Plaintiff realizes that it would be expedient for this court to blow off the Plaintiff's case in hopes he will eventually go away. Plaintiff asks that this court not do that and that this court uphold its oath to the people and to the constitution and rule according to the law.

Defendants have filed three motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).ll three motions are improper in that none were filed by counsel who can legally represent the clients who they claim to represent. Mr. Duncan can represent himself pro se, but not in combination with simultaneously representing other defendants, thus his motion representing himself is defective as well. Judge Syler can not be represented by the Attorney General because it is not the responsibility of the Attorney General to defend judges who break the rules. The Attorney General is supposed to prosecute judges who break the rules. Even if the Attorney General were allowed to represent Judge Syler, since Judge Syler is immune from damages, Judge Syler lacks standing to defend any issue covered by immunity. Thus he can not properly raise a motion to dismiss based on 12(b)(6). Therefore, this court can't consider the defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pl aintiff states for the record that the Plaintiff believes that if he were to appear before this court represented by a person who was prohibited by the rules from acting as counsel, that this court would strike his motions in a heartbeat and dismiss counsel. Plaintiff asks this court be fair and treat the defendants likewise.

Thus the Plaintiff will not reply to Defendants' motions to dismiss directly because Plaintiff believes that this court will rule fairly and strike their motions. Plaintiff however wishes to append his Brief by addressing issues that were coincidentally raised by the Defendants and Plaintiff respectfully moves for leave of this court to now address these issues for the purpose of clarification.

Although this all started with a divorce proceeding, this case is not a domestic relations case and the subject matter is not divorce. This case is about civil rights violation, conspiracy to obstruct justice, fraud, fraudulent conspiracy, tampering with evidence, false affidavit, and perjury. The allegations are that the defendants violated the Plaintiff's due process rights in the underlying state case. The underlying state case is not a divorce or domestic relations case either. In that case the subject matter is fraudulent conspiracy, fraud upon the court, and fabrication of false evidence. This isn't a divorce case.

The Commission on Retirement Removal and Discipline is a joke. This organization seems to have a goal of covering up the misdeeds of judges rather than enforcing judicial standards. It was never meant to be an alternative remedy to replace the federal court system. The Commission on Retirement Removal and Discipline will not start an investigation while trial court action is pending. Should this court find judicial misconduct, the Plaintiff will forward the finding to the Commission on Retirement Removal and Discipline.

Plaintiff admits to being disgruntled. Who wouldn't be under the same circumstances? One only has to read the Plaintiff's section on damages to understand why he is disgruntled. The Plaintiff has absolutely no confidence in the integrity of the judicial system whatsoever. The Plaintiff can find no rules or cases where the demeanor of the Plaintiff was a factor in justifying a motion to dismiss and the fact that the Plaintiff is disgruntled should not be considered in a 12(b)(6) motion.

Plaintiff admits that he has been beaten by some of the defendants in other court actions and has had other courts ignore the Plaintiff. However, these cases are completely unrelated to this case and there are no issues before this court that were decided in any other court. The issues before this court didn't exist in those other cases.

Plaintiff wishes to point out that the Missouri Court of Appeals, The Missouri Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court decided not to rule on the issue of defendants representing defendants. They didn't rule in favor of Judge Syler's position. Since Judge Syler ordered certification of the question and the higher courts refused to certify it, it would appear that the higher courts refused to support Judge Syler's ruling.

The Plaintiff does not have to allege in detail everything about conspiracy in his pleading as long as he has given the defendants "fair notice" which he has done in his brief. The landmark case on "notice pleading" is Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) which states:

On a motion to dismiss the court will construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true. (Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (8^th Cir. 1997). The court will not grant the motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim[s] which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson.

Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states:

Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion to dismiss, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom. That means if this court can figure out a legal theory that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of, this court must deny a motion to dismiss on the court's legal theory. And considering that the Plaintiff is suing lawyers and judges who are part of the "brotherhood", this court has an obligation to try hard to come up with that legal theory to avoid the appearance of bias.

Plaintiff need not allege personal involvement by all the parties. When a person is part of a conspiracy, one does not require a hub and spoke form. One need only be part of a chain of conspirators. Ms. Stringfellow need not have had personal contact with Judge Syler nor had a meeting of the minds with Judge Syler herself. Ms. Stringfellow employed Mr. Sharp as her agent who did the dirty work in her behalf with her full knowledge and approval. Likewise, The Bar Plan is fully liable under the allegation that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, who represented them did violate the laws with The Bar Plan's full knowledge and approval. So even if Respondent Superior fails, The Bar Plan was an active participant in the conspiracy.

A similar example would be a "murder for hire" plot. If Sally hires Dick to kill Jane, Sally is guilty of murder even though she wasn't there and never touched the gun. Neither Ms. Stringfellow nor The Bar Plan conspired with Judge Syler to obstruct justice. They hired Mr. Sharp and Mr. Duncan to conspire to obstruct justice for them.

Plaintiff has argued in his brief based on Britt v. Suckle, (1978) 453 F Supp 987, that 1985(2) does not require class based animus as does 1985(3). In spite of that, Plaintiff claims he is a member of a class and was deprived of his rights based on being a member of that class.

To claim class based discrimination, one has to be a member of a class of people with similar characteristics and to be oppressed based upon the characteristics of that class. The class need not be racial or gender based but need merely to have an identifiable common characteristic.

In Reese v. Dallas County 505 F.2d 879, the issue was the voting rights of people in a class of "city dwellers" versus rural area voters. One became a member of that class because their rights were being infringed because they were members of that class. Being black doesn't make you a member of an invidious class unless you are discriminated against because someone has acted against blacks.

In this case the Plaintiff is pro se and he is being discriminated against because he is pro se. Missouri Rule 4.2 that prohibits lawyers from communicating with parties represented by counsel. If the Plaintiff had a lawyer, the Plaintiff’s lawyer wouldn’t be allowed to communicate with Defendant Stringfellow’s lawyer because Defendant Stringfellow’s lawyer, Mr. Sharp is himself a defendant and is represented by Mr. Duncan. Only because the Plaintiff is pro se can Judge Syler get away with attempting to allow a defendant to represent another defendant because a pro se litigant isn’t subject to Missouri Rule 4.2. Thus Judge Syler took advantage of the Plaintiff’s invidious classification to deny him equal protection under the law and his rights to due process of law. Thus pro se becomes a class-based animus with respect to this case. Plaintiff has extensive arguments on this subject in his brief.

Finally, the Supreme Court has long since defined the [right] "to maintain actions in the courts of the State" as [one of the] "privileges and immunities" secured to each citizen of the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Ward v. Maryland, 79 US 419, 430 (1870). Plaintiff respectfully contends that this too is a constitutionally protected property right and that he is a member of a class of citizens who's right to due process has been infringed.

Judge Syler not only failed to recuse himself in the state case, but now has scheduled a hearing in that case for April 17^th 1998. In his rulings to not recuse, Judge Syler failed to follow proper procedures, which requires a hearing before a second judge. Plaintiff reminds this court that he has asked for an injunction to prohibit Judge Syler from proceeding further. It would be in Judge Syler's interest for this court to issue an injunction tprevent him from acting in the absence of all jurisdiction and waving his judicial immunity.

________________________________

Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 03-16-98