In the United States District Court for

For the Western District of Missouri

Southern Division

 

Marc Perkel,

Plaintiff,

 

Vs

 

James R. Sharp,

William A. Wear,

The law firm of Wear and Sharp LLC

Vicki L. Stringfellow,

Donald R. Duncan,

The law firm of Turner, Reid, Duncan, Loomer, and Patton, P.C.,

The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Co,

 

Defendants,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

 

Case No: 98-3040-CV-S-3

 

AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of this action is based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1331, 1331(a) and the Due Process Clause of Art. IV of the United States Constitution. This court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's common law claims, infra, and venue is proper pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391. The issue before this court is the violation of the Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 1985 and raise federal questions and constitutional issues.

Plaintiff

Defendants

Citizenship

Plaintiff Marc Perkel is a citizen of the state of Missouri, Defendants are all citizens of the State of Missouri. The Honorable William L. Syler is a Circuit Court Judge of the State of Missouri. The law firm defendants are law firms in Springfield Missouri. The Bar Plan is an insurance company located in St. Louis Missouri.

The Facts

  1. On January 15th 1997, Plaintiff Marc Perkel filed a lawsuit against Defendants Wear, Sharp, and Stringfellow (Greene County Case: 197CC0170) alleging that defendants acted together to defraud the plaintiff in an underlying divorce case.
  2. Although Defendants Wear and Sharp were named defendants in the underlying case, Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp appeared as counsel for their codefendant, Ms. Stringfellow.
  3. Mr. Duncan was hired by The Bar Plan and appeared as counsel for Defendants Wear and Sharp.
  4. It is a conflict of interest and a violation of the Missouri Rules of Court for a defendant to represent another defendant.
  5. On January 23rd 1997 Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Wear and Sharp as counsel for Defendant Stringfellow because they were defendants and were attempting to represent their codefendant, which isn't allowed under the rules.
  6. On February 10th 1997 Plaintiff filed a notice informing the defendants and the court that Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp would be called as a witness and they would be in violation of Missouri Rule 3.7 if they continued to represent Defendant Stringfellow.
  7. The judges of Greene County recused themselves and the Missouri Supreme Court appointed the Honorable William Syler to hear the case. The first hearing was set to be held on July 14th 1997.
  8. On May 19th 1997 Plaintiff filed a motion asking for a temporary restraining order to prevent execution of the underlying divorce judgement.
  9. Judge Syler never considered Plaintiff's motion for a TRO.
  10. On May 29th 1997 Plaintiff filed another motion to disqualify counsel because of defendants representing defendants and asked Judge Syler for an immediate ruling.
  11. Although Judge Syler had a duty to do so, Judge Syler did not respond to Plaintiff's request for a ruling.
  12. On June 2nd 1997 Plaintiff Marc Perkel amended his pleading to include Mr. Duncan as a defendant alleging that Mr. Duncan broke the rules to help his clients execute a judgement obtained through fraud.
  13. On June 26th 1997, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Intent to Depose to all the Defendants and Judge Syler and filed his notice in the record. In that notice Plaintiff informed the Defendants and the Court that he will depose Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp and that they will be material witnesses. This notice was the second notice that Wear and Sharp would be a witness.
  14. The Notice included a warning about their violation of Rule 3.7 prohibiting witnesses from being an advocate at trial.
  15. On July 14th 1997 a hearing was held to take up pending motions, the issue of improper representation was raised.
  16. At that hearing Defendant Stringfellow in open court was questioned by the judge and after testifying that she understood the consequences, that she knowingly and willingly waived conflict of interest with regards to her being represented by another defendant.
  17. The Plaintiff pointed out case law to the court indicating that conflict of interest can not be waived when it is known that a lawyer is going to be a witness. Plaintiff cited State of Missouri ex rel., v. The Honorable Frank Conley, 809 S.W.2d 405.
  18. A defendant can not legally represent another defendant. It would be a violation of numerous rules and is the very definition of conflict of interest.
  19. Judge Syler knew or should have known that defendants can't represent defendants.
  20. Judge Syler asked Defendant Sharp, if he was going to be a witness.
  21. In response Defendant Sharp replied, "No".
  22. Defendant Sharp knew, because he was twice notified, and because he was a defendant, that he was going to be a witness.
  23. Mr. Sharp's statement to the court that he wasn't going to be a witness was knowingly untrue.
  24. Judge Syler also knew that Defendant Sharp was a defendant and was therefore a witness.
  25. Judge Syler had been twice notified that Defendant Sharp was going to be a witness and therefore had actual knowledge that Defendant Sharp was going to be a witness.
  26. Judge Syler asked the question, if Defendant Sharp was going to be a witness, with the expectation that Mr. Sharp was going to lie to the court and say he wasn't.
  27. A meeting of the minds occurred at the moment Judge Syler asked the question. Judge Syler asked the question. Defendant Sharp realized that Judge Syler expected him to lie so as to give Judge Syler an excuse to allow defendants to represent defendants.
  28. At that moment Judge Syler conspired with Defendant Sharp to lie about Defendant Sharp's status as a witness so that Judge Syler, acting as a judge under color of state law, and Defendant Sharp could proceed with their common goal of dismissing the case and denying the Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected right to due process of law.
  29. Immediately after Judge Syler and Defendant Sharp lied to the court, Judge Syler decided to allow defendants to represent other defendants.
  30. Judge Syler willingly broke the Rules of Court in the furtherance of a conspiracy.
  31. Plaintiff objected and asked the Court for an immediate appeal to certify the question, stating to the court that to continue with improper representation would be meaningless.
  32. Judge Syler granted Plaintiff's motion to certify the question and issued the following order:

    33. "The Court takes up Motion #2, Motion to Disqualify Defendant Vicki Stringfellow’s Attorney’s for Conflict of Interest. After examination of Deft Stringfellow in regard to her representation, the Court denies the motion. Whereupon, Petr requests certification of the ruling. After consideration of requests for certification, the Court recesses all proceedings pending Petr’s certification to the Court of Appeals."

  33. The Missouri Court of Appeals does not have a procedure for certifying a question of law. Judge Syler ordered a procedure that doesn't exist.
  34. Judge Syler knew the procedure for certifying a question of law he was ordering didn't exist.
  35. Judge Syler entered an invalid order, conspiring with the defendants, with the intent of frustrating the Plaintiff in his pursuit of due process of law.
  36. Plaintiff took the question to the Missouri Court of Appeals who refused to answer the question stating that they didn't have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders.
  37. Plaintiff then took the question to the Missouri Supreme Court who also refused to answer the question.
  38. Plaintiff then took the issue to the United States Supreme Court who refused to answer the question.
  39. On July 29th 1997 Plaintiff filed his first motion to recuse Judge Syler.
  40. In his motion to recuse, Plaintiff complained that the Court ignored his request for a TRO, became an advocate at trial for the defendants, made a ridiculous ruling to allow defendants to represent other defendants, ignored the Missouri Rules of Court, complained about the five hour drive, and that Judge Syler was covering up the misconduct of the defendant attorneys.
  41. Although the Plaintiff's motion was not filed in affidavit form, Judge Syler had a duty to recuse himself on his own motion under the circumstances cited in the Plaintiff's motion to recuse.
  42. On July 31st 1997 Judge Syler, acting under color of state law, in furtherance of the conspiracy, denied Plaintiff's motion to recuse without comment and without a hearing.
  43. On September 9th 1997 Plaintiff sent interrogatories to Defendant Sharp asking for the name of the court reporter who was to take Plaintiff's deposition on January 4th 1995. This was a deposition that the Plaintiff was accused of failing to attend and for which the court sanctioned the Plaintiff.
  44. In response to his interrogatory, Defendant Sharp on October 9th 1997 revealed that he had no court reporter to take Plaintiff's deposition.
  45. Defendant Duncan knew all along that Wear and Sharp had no court reporter present for the deposition.
  46. Nonetheless, Defendant Duncan filed several motions indicating that there was a deposition and that the Plaintiff missed it when he had actual knowledge that there was no deposition.
  47. On October 20th 1997 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgement.
  48. The motion stated the Defendants had committed fraud upon the court by having the Plaintiff sanctioned for not attending a deposition that never occurred.
  49. Plaintiff argued that since there was no court reporter present, there was no deposition.
  50. Defendant Duncan was the lawyer for The Bar Plan.
  51. Defendants Wear and Sharp had malpractice insurance through The Bar Plan.
  52. Although Defendant Duncan and his law firm are independent contractors, their client, The Bar Plan had a right and a duty to control their conduct and activities.
  53. On or about November 12th 1997 Plaintiff wrote a letter to The Bar Plan. In that letter Plaintiff warned The Bar Plan that their insured, Wear and Sharp had revealed through interrogatories that they had no court reporter present to take the Plaintiff's deposition.
  54. The letter warned and that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan was committing fraud upon the court by filing motions representing to the court that there was a deposition that the Plaintiff missed when he knew no deposition actually occurred.
  55. The letter also stated that if Mr. Duncan didn't know that there was no court reporter, he now does and had a duty to reveal this fraud to the court and take remedial action.
  56. The letter warned them that Mr. Duncan, acting as an agent for The Bar Plan, might be creating liability for them through his improper activities, and that they should look into it. The letter also asked them to settle this case.
  57. On November 18th 1997 all defendants, in two separate but similar answers, responded to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgement
  58. Both answers included Exhibit A and Exhibit B that are copies of faxes sent by the plaintiff. These exhibits are identical in both responses.
  59. Defendants altered Exhibit B to conceal the date that it was sent by crossing out the date of the fax with something similar to a thin tipped black Flair pen. However, the time of Exhibit B was left unaltered.
  60. Exhibit B was faxed on December 21st 1994, however, in their responses both lawyers misrepresented the crossed out date as December 22nd 1994. This change reversed the chronological order of Exhibit A and Exhibit B.
  61. On November 24th 1997 Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants' responses because they had tampered with evidence by obliterating the date on Exhibit B and stating in their motion that the fax was sent the day after it was really sent.
  62. Plaintiff pointed out to the court that he believed that Wear and Sharp committed a criminal act by Tampering with Physical Evidence and urged the court to take action against Wear and Sharp for their criminal conduct.
  63. Judge Syler has a duty to the Constitution to take action when it becomes clear that counsel has engaged in criminal conduct in his courtroom.
  64. Nonetheless, Judge Syler, in furtherance of the conspiracy, acting as a judge under color of state law, chose to ignore the criminal conduct of the defendants.
  65. On November 26th Plaintiff sent a second letter to The Bar Plan. In that letter Plaintiff informed The Bar Plan that their insured, Wear and Sharp, had tampered with physical evidence in violation of Missouri Statute Section 575.100, and that there lawyer, Mr. Duncan, had proffered this evidence to the court.
  66. Plaintiff again warned The Bar Plan that their lawyer was committing fraud while acting as their agent.
  67. Plaintiff again asked The Bar Plan for a good faith settlement.
  68. As a result of the letter, The Bar Plan had actual knowledge that their lawyer, Defendant Duncan, had participated in a conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff by proffering Wear and Sharp's tampered evidence to the court.
  69. The Bar Plan had a right and a duty to control their lawyer and stop him from committing criminal acts.
  70. Nonetheless, The Bar Plan took no action to stop their lawyers misconduct.
  71. On November 28th 1997 the Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendants to take their deposition on December 19th 1997.
  72. The Defendants had already acquiesced to discovery by answering two sets of interrogatories.
  73. On or about November 30th, Defendants filed for a protective order to stop discovery.
  74. On December 1st 1997 Plaintiff filed another motion to disqualify counsel pointing out that Defendant Sharp had already answered interrogatories and thus established himself as a witness.
  75. Judge Syler again, in his role as judge acting under color of state law, in furtherance of the conspiracy, ignored Plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel.
  76. On December 3rd 1997 Judge Syler, in his role as judge, acting under color of state law in furtherance of the conspiracy, heard defendants' motion. Judge Syler granted the Defendants' protective order and issued an order staying all discoveries.
  77. Judge Syler's protective order denied the Plaintiff his right to prosecute his case by denying his constitutionally protected right to due process of law.
  78. Judge Syler intentionally shut down discovery to prevent the Plaintiff from discovering further criminal conduct on the part of the Defendants.
  79. Judge Syler in shutting down discovery conspired with the defendants to obstruct justice by covering up criminal conduct on the part of the Defendants.
  80. On December 8th 1997 Plaintiff filed a second motion for summary judgement stating that the tampered evidence constituted a criminal act and can be construed as an admission by conduct that the defendants could not win the case on the merits.
  81. In his second motion for summary judgement Plaintiff urges the Court to take affirmative steps to deal with the defendants criminal conduct, including imposition of sanctions.
  82. On January 6th 1998 Defendants responded to Plaintiff's second motion for summary judgement.
  83. In their response Defendant Sharp states that he did not obliterate the date. He stated that he highlighted the date and that it photocopied to solid black, and then he lost the original.
  84. Mr. Sharp made these statements in a sworn affidavit before a notary public.
  85. Based on scientific knowledge, information, and belief, Mr. Sharp's affidavit is in fact a false affidavit.
  86. Defendant Sharp's statement in his affidavit that a highlighter can photocopy to solid black is scientifically impossible.
  87. Mr. Sharp's has actual knowledge that his affidavit was in fact false.
  88. This affidavit was proffered to the court through his attorney, Defendant Duncan, who also knew that the affidavit was false.
  89. On January 9th 1998 Plaintiff wrote a third letter to The Bar Plan.
  90. In that letter Plaintiff informed them that their insured, Mr. Sharp, had made a false sworn affidavit and that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, had proffered the false affidavit to the court. Plaintiff again asked for a settlement.
  91. The Bar Plan, having actual knowledge that their lawyer was breaking the law, again failed to respond to the Plaintiff or take any remedial action to stop their lawyer from acting in the furtherance of a fraudulent conspiracy to deny the Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected right to due process of law when they had a right and a duty to do so.
  92. On January 12th 1998 Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants' response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgement. In his reply Plaintiff stated that a photocopy machine couldn't copy highlighted text as solid black and cited a number of facts that strongly indicated that Mr. Sharp's affidavit can not possibly be true.
  93. The reply contained a warning to Defendant Duncan that he had in fact proffered a false affidavit to the court and that he had a duty to take remedial action to avoid becoming a party to criminal conduct.
  94. The reply also contained a message to Judge Syler that he had a duty to refer the matter to the Prosecutor for a criminal investigation.
  95. The reply urged Judge Syler to stop covering up the criminal activity of these lawyers and to start doing his job.
  96. Judge Syler, in the furtherance of the conspiracy, ignored the Plaintiff's motion and took no action to deal with a prima facia case of Tampering with Physical Evidence, False Affidavit, and Perjury when he had a duty to do so.
  97. This reply included a color test sheet using six colors of highlighters for the defendants to test to see if they could duplicate the solid black effect which Mr. Sharp claims.
  98. Plaintiff challenged the Defendant's and Judge Syler to photocopy the colored sheet to see for themselves that Defendant Sharp's claim is impossible.
  99. On January 23rd 1998 Plaintiff filed his Second Motion to Recuse Judge pursuant to Section 508.090 of the Missouri Code.
  100. In his motion to recuse, Plaintiff complained that Judge Syler, in failing to investigate possible criminal wrongdoing by the defendants, violated the Plaintiff's 14th Amendment property rights and right to due process of law. That Judge Syler conduct violated his civil rights and a conspired to obstruct justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) of the federal code. Plaintiff complained Judge Syler violated Canon 1, Canon 2(a), Canon 3(a)(1), Canon 3(a)(3), Canon 3(a)(4), Canon 3(a)(5), and Canon 3(d)(1). Plaintiff complained that the Judge's impartiality might therefore be questioned.
  101. Plaintiff's motion was not in affidavit form.
  102. Nonetheless, Judge Syler had a duty to recuse himself under these circumstances in order comply with the Canons of Judicial Conduct and to uphold the integrity of the judicial system.
  103. In the furtherance of the conspiracy, on January 26th 1998 Judge Syler denied Plaintiff's second motion to recuse without comment and without a hearing.
  104. Defendant Duncan, as an agent for The Bar Plan acts under their control and authority. The Bar Plan has a right to control the conduct of Mr. Duncan.
  105. None of the Defendants have produced any evidence to refute Plaintiff's claim that it is scientifically impossible for a highlighter pen to photocopy to solid black even though they were invited to do so.
  106. Defendant Stringfellow was sent a copy of all motions and is fully aware of her attorneys conduct and misconduct.
  107. Defendant Stringfellow has a right and a duty to control her lawyers.
  108. Although Defendant Stringfellow had actual knowledge that her lawyers were breaking the law, she failed to take any remedial measures to prevent them from doing so. Her lawyers acted with her full knowledge and approval.
  109. None of the Defendants have taken any remedial action since the criminal conduct was exposed.
  110. Plaintiff is part of a class of pro se litigants and the defendants have violated the Plaintiff rights based on his membership in a class of pro se litigants. The Defendants could not have attempted to represent other defendants if counsel represented the Plaintiff.
  111. Defendant Stringfellow is busy selling or trying to sell assets from the ill-gotten judgement and has garnished a receivable from the Plaintiff’s corporation for about $11,000.
  112. If this court allows the Defendants to continue to take the Plaintiff’s assets, the Defendants, who have much stronger economic resources, will have an unfair advantage over the Plaintiff.

    113. More Conspiracy

  113. Judge Syler scheduled a hearing to be held on April 17th 1998 in the underlying state fraud case to hear all pending motions.
  114. On April 1st 1998 Plaintiff filed his third motion to recuse Judge Syler.
  115. This third motion to recuse was filed in affidavit form and was procedurally correct.
  116. The motion indicated that Judge Syler was to be called to the stand to be questioned as a witness.
  117. The rules and case law of Missouri require that when a litigant files a motion to recuse a judge in proper form, and the judge is going to be a witness, a second judge must hear the motion to recuse.
  118. Judge Cody Hanna from Dallas County was appointed to hear the motion to recuse.
  119. The Plaintiff was given no notice that a second judge was appointed or who the judge was.
  120. On April 17th the hearing to recuse Judge Syler was held in Greene County Circuit Court.
  121. Upon realizing the Judge Syler wasn't in the courtroom, Plaintiff asked Judge Hanna where Judge Syler was.
  122. Judge Hanna indicated that he wasn't in the courtroom and indicated he didn't know where Judge Syler was.
  123. Plaintiff told Judge Hanna that he wished to call Judge Syler to the stand as a witness.
  124. Judge Hanna responded that he wasn't in the courtroom.
  125. Plaintiff asked Judge Hanna where Judge Syler was. Plaintiff asked if Judge Syler was in the courthouse. Judge Hanna indicated he didn't know. Plaintiff pointed out that he wanted to put Judge Syler on the stand and asked the Court to produce him. Plaintiff pointed out that he had indicated in his motion to recuse that Judge Syler was to be a witness. Plaintiff pointed out that the reason a second judge was needed was because Judge Syler was to be called as a witness. Plaintiff indicated to Judge Hanna that the only reason he was present was because Judge Syler was to testify.
  126. Judge Hanna asked if the Plaintiff has subpoenaed Judge Syler.
  127. Plaintiff responded that he hadn't, but that he didn't need to. Plaintiff argued that since Judge Syler had called the hearing, that the Plaintiff would reasonable expect the judge to be there.
  128. Plaintiff asserted to the court that he believed that what was to happen at this hearing was that the motion to recuse would be heard before Judge Hanna, and should his motion fail, that Judge Syler was to hear the pending motions as scheduled. Plaintiff asked the court if this was so and indicated he believed that Judge Syler was hiding in the courthouse somewhere.
  129. In response Judge Hanna pretended to be ignorant of these facts.
  130. Plaintiff continued to assert his right to put Judge Syler on the stand indicating that he believed Judge Syler was hiding from the Plaintiff to avoid being examined as a witness.
  131. Laura Vogel, who is an assistant to the Attorney General of Missouri, and who is representing Judge Syler in this lawsuit, made an appearance at the hearing to recuse Judge Syler as Judge Syler's attorney.
  132. Laura Vogel is not a private attorney. She works for the State of Missouri as an assistant to the Attorney General and represents the interests of the State.
  133. The law prohibits Laura Vogel from engaging in private legal practice. Her acts are therefore acts of the State and she is acting under color of state law.
  134. Laura Vogel, as a representative of the State of Missouri, in her capacity as counsel for Judge Syler addressed Judge Hanna to argue in behalf of Judge Syler and the State of Missouri.
  135. Ms. Vogel appeared claiming to be in the capacity of friend of the court.
  136. Ms. Vogel stated that Judge Syler would appear in the courtroom to continue the proceeding based on the outcome of the recusal hearing.
  137. Ms. Vogel argued that Judge Syler should not be required to appear as a witness in his own recusal hearing and stated in the alternative that if he is to testify, that the Plaintiff's questions should be censored and screened before the Plaintiff can ask them.
  138. Ms. Vogel stated to the Court that she could produce Judge Syler for questioning.
  139. The state case is a private civil lawsuit. Judge Syler is the judge and not a defendant in this suit. The State of Missouri is not a party to the state action.
  140. Ms. Vogel, who's job it is to represent the People of Missouri, had no right and no standing to make an appearance in this suit.
  141. Ms. Vogel, acting under color of state law, conspired with Judge Syler and Judge Hanna to deny the Plaintiff his right to call Judge Syler to the stand in his recusal hearing.
  142. Judge Hanna refused to allow the Plaintiff to call Judge Syler for questioning.
  143. Judge Hanna, Laura Vogel, and all the defendants knew Judge Syler was hiding out to avoid being called as a witness and conspired together to obstruct and deny the Plaintiff his right to call Judge Syler to the stand and denied the Plaintiff his constitutionally protected right to due process of law.
  144. Judge Hanna then restricted the hearing to the single issue for recusal of Judge Syler being a defendant in a federal civil right lawsuit.
  145. Plaintiff pointed out that there were a lot of issues besides that one. Judge Hanna said that because this was the third motion to recuse, that the other two motions were already decided and those issues were dealt with. Therefore the Plaintiff could only argue the new issues between recusal number two and recusal number three.
  146. Plaintiff pointed out that the first two recusals were decided without a hearing and that a judge could rule without a hearing only if there were procedural flaws. A ruling on the merits ruires a hearing. Since there was no hearing, Judge Syler couldn't have ruled on the merits. Therefore, all the issues were before the court.
  147. Plaintiff again asked Judge Hanna to produce Judge Syler for questioning, suggesting that Judge Syler could answer the question as to if he ruled on the procedures or on the merits. Judge Hanna still wouldn't produce Judge Syler.
  148. Judge Hanna was unpersuaded and denied the Plaintiff his right to argue any other reason for recusing Judge Syler other than that he was a federal defendant.
  149. Plaintiff pointed out to Judge Hanna that the rules require that a judge recuse if he has an interest in the outcome of the case and that the fact that Judge Syler was being sued constituted an interest in the outcome of the case.
  150. Plaintiff also pointed out that the standard of review was that if a reasonable person would question if the judge was capable of an impartial hearing, which he should recuse.
  151. Plaintiff then pointed out that the motion to recuse was to be construed liberally in favor of recusal so as to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the justice system.
  152. Plaintiff then applied the facts stating that when a judge allows defendants to represent defendants, shuts down discovery when criminal conduct is uncovered, and is being sued for obstruction of justice, that a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the judge.
  153. Plaintiff added that a judge has a duty to recuse himself on his own motion under these circumstances.
  154. Judge Hanna had a duty to recuse Judge Syler based on the Missouri Rules of Court and not just on the motion of the Plaintiff. Given the facts before the court, Judge Hanna had an obligation to the Constitution to recuse Judge Syler no matter how defective the Plaintiff's motion was.
  155. Judge Hanna ruled against the Plaintiff and allowed Judge Syler to continue to hear the case.
  156. Judge Hanna acted in his official capacity as a state judge and his acts were therefore done under color of state law.
  157. Judge Hanna knew Judge Syler was hiding in the courthouse and he conspired with Judge Syler, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Defendants in order to deny the Plaintiff the right to question Judge Syler in his recusal hearing.
  158. Judge Hanna had a duty to recuse Judge Syler, but fail to do so.
  159. A recess was called and it was announced that after the recess, Judge Syler would hear the rest of the case.
  160. During the recess, the Plaintiff went to the Circuit Clerk and filed his dismissal of the case.
  161. The Plainti had prepared dismissal papers in the event that the fix was in and Judge Hanna failed to uphold the law and recuse Judge Syler.
  162. The Plaintiff dismissed the case at that time for the purpose of denying Judge Syler jurisdiction.
  163. The Plaintiff feared that Judge Syler would continue to abuse his judicial authority and undermine the Plaintiff's right to due process of law.

    164. Counts

  164. Fraud - All Defendants - Plaintiff respectfully contends that when tested against standards of fraud as specified in foregoing paragraphs, the challenged conduct constitutes fraud and fraud upon the court.
  165. Fraudulent Conspiracy - All Defendants - Plaintiff respectfully contends that when tested against the standards of conspiracy as specified on the foregoing paragraphs, the challenged conduct constitutes a fraudulent conspiracy to violate the Plaintiff's protected right to due process of law.
  166. Perjury, False Affidavit - Defendant Sharp - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the affidavit of Defendant Sharp is a false affidavit and is in violation of Missouri Statutes 575.040 and 575.050.
  167. Suborning Perjury - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate the Defendants either directly committed perjury or supported the other Defendants in their act of committing perjury.
  168. Waiver of Conflict of Interest - Defendant Stringfellow - Plaintiff respectfully contends that because Defendant Stringfellow waived conflict of interest after being questioned under oath in open court that she cannot isolate herself from the misdeeds of her lawyers. Ms. Stringfellow has been kept fully informed as to the conduct of her lawyers and her lawyers are acting with her knowledge and approval. Plaintiff respectfully contends that she is a part and is fully liable both civilly and criminally as a fully informed joint participant in the conduct of her attorneys.
  169. Tampering with Physical Evidence - Defendants Wear and Sharp - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that these defendants altered evidence and proffered the altered evidence to the court in violation of Missouri Statute 575.100. Plaintiff respectfully contends that Defendant Duncan proffered this evidence to the court knowing that Defendants Wear and Sharp altered it.
  170. Tort of Bad Faith - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that The Bar Plan has committed a Tort of Bad Faith against the Plaintiff.
  171. Party to the Conspiracy - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that The Bar Plan is a party to the conspiracy because they had actual knowledge of the misdeeds of their attorney and the insured defendants and failed to act to prevent further criminal conduct when they were warned three times and had a duty to act. The defendant lawyers broke the law and conspired with state actors with The Bar Plan's full knowledge and approval.
  172. Color of State Law - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that because the Defendants conspired, for the common purpose of denying the Plaintiff of his due process rights, with two judges and the Assistant Attorney General. The judges and the Attorney General are state actors and acted in their official capacities. The Defendants acted under color of state law and can be sued in 1983 and 1985(2) civil rights actions.
  173. Civil Rights - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff's 14th amendment rights to property, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws.
  174. Denial of Due Process - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the Defendants conspired with state actors under color of law to deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected right to due process of law.
  175. Corruptly Conspire with Judges - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the Defendant lawyers corruptly conspired with the judges and the Office of the Attorney General in the performance of their official duties to deprive the Plaintiff of due process of law.
  176. Obstruction of Justice - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendants conspired with Judge Syler to obstruct justice within the meaning of Title 42 USC § 1985(2).
  177. Concealing Criminal Conduct - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendants conspired with Judge Syler, a state actor who used his power as a state judge to conceal criminal conduct.
  178. Professional Misconduct - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendant lawyers violated numerous rules of professional conduct as well as breaking laws that carry the penalty of Class D felony and Class A misdemeanors.
  179. Judicial Misconduct - Judge Syler - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Judge Syler, in allowing defendants to represent defendants, suborning perjury, and stopping discovery when criminal conduct was uncovered amounts to judicial misconduct.
  180. Failure to Recuse - - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Judge Syler violated the Plaintiff's civil rights by obstructing justice by failing to recuse himself when a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would believe that the judge's impartiality could be questioned.
  181. Hiding a Witness - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Judge Hanna conspired with Judge Syler, Laura Vogel, and the defendants to conceal a witness for the purpose of depriving the Plaintiff of his right to due process of law, to prevent the Plaintiff from calling Judge Syler to the stand to testify.
  182. Interfering with a Judicial Process - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Laura Vogel, in her official capacity as Assistant Attorney General made an improper appearance in the hearing to recuse Judge Syler and interfered with the Plaintiff's right to due process of law. Plaintiff contends that Laura Vogel had no standing to appear in this case.
  183. Meeting of the Minds - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that a meeting of the minds occurred between the private defendants and the two judges and the office of the Attorney General, who acted in their official capacities, under color of state law, to form a conspiracy for the purpose of defrauding the Plaintiff and denying him his constitutionally protected right to due process of law.

    184. Relief

    Declaratory Relief

  184. Plaintiff asks the court to rule that it is improper for defendants to represent other defendants.
  185. Plaintiff asks the court to rule that Defendant Sharp's affidavit appears to be false and should be investigated by a Federal Prosecutor.
  186. Make a finding that Judge Syler should have recused himself from the State proceeding.
  187. Make a finding that Judge Hanna should have recused Judge Syler.
  188. Make a finding that Judge Syler's actions constitute judicial misconduct.
  189. Make a finding that Laura Vogel interfered with a judicial process.
  190. Court costs should be assessed to Defendants.

    191. Injunctive Relief

  191. Plaintiff asks the court for a TRO and a hearing to grant him an immediate injunction to stop the execution of the underlying divorce judgement.
  192. Order Defendants to return or to put into escrow all money and property that the Defendants have taken from the Plaintiff.
  193. This court should make an immediate order preventing defendants from even attempting to represent other defendants before this court, and this court should issue orders sanctions sua sponte if the defendants attempt to undermine the Plaintiff's due process rights before this court.

Compensatory Damages

Plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages, the amount of which is still accruing. Defendants' above described conduct has effected plaintiff to the extent that;

  1. it cost him about $30,000 in separate maintenance, about $20,000 in attorneys' fees, about $12,000 worth of tools, trailer, and other farm equipment, $117,000 value of 80 acres of land (less about $80,000 in debt on the land), credit card payments, about $8,000 Honda Accord owned by Computer Tyme Inc., about $11,000 in garnished receivables of Computer Tyme Inc., and hundreds of thousands of dollars in lost income and future income; and,
  2. has prevented him from enjoying his farm, using his tractors, building his home, moving his busess to Fair Grove, and enjoying country living; and,
  3. it has injured him emotionally, causing him mental suffering, loss of sleep, depression, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, anger, mortification, shock, memory loss, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, and paranoia, uncertainty, apprehension; and,
  4. as well as incurring him the expenses of litigation, it has required thousands of hours of his time and energy to learn the law and for research and writing to defending himself, sufficient time and energy to preclude him from procuring other work as a computer programmer, writing software, keeping his software current, running his business and having a normal social life; and,
  5. it has caused him to suffer a lack of concentration that has resulted in an inability to perform his job, and as a result he has been unable to write new programs to market and keep competitive and stay current with computer technology. As a result, he has had to lay off 4 of his 5 employees, lost his market share, caused him to fail to keep up with current technology, caused him to get behind on loans, destroyed his credit rating, caused him to not be able to afford to advertise his products, lost the value of his software copyrights (which Defendants have valued at $750,000), and has virtually destroyed his software company. That Plaintiff has suffered severe and permanent damage to his ability to earn a living as a computer programmer; and,
  6. damaged his reputation as a programmer and a business owner, loss of identity and standing in the world of nerds, caused him to be embarrassed and shamed before his customers because his company could no longer meet the software needs of his customer base; and,
  7. loss of his career leaving the Plaintiff wondering what he will do for a living and in need of retraining in order to become competitive in the field of computer software; and,
  8. it has impaired his ability to engage in recreational, family, dating, travel, and social activities, and has resulted in a loss of his enjoyment due to his inability to engage in such activities; and,
  9. destroyed his faith and trust in the American judicial system, causing him to believe that lawyers and judges can break the rules with impunity and get away with it; and,
  10. it has destroyed his motivation to earn a living because he believes anything he earns will be taken away from him. Plaintiff fears that execution of the fraudulently obtained judgement will leave him broke and homeless as the Defendants takes his home, truck, and what's left of his business and puts him out on the street. He lives in fear that he will be incarcerated for contempt of court for standing up for his constitutional rights and for failing to comply with a divorce judgement in excess of his ability to pay; and,
  11. it is at present causing him emotional pain and suffering and he anticipates permanent emotional pain and suffering from it. That he anticipates that he will never again be able marry or to function as a normal member of society.

Malice

Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendants constitutes wanton and wicked conduct and were done willfully and maliciously.

Punitive Damages

Defendants' conduct as described above is willful, intentional and malicious resulting from fraud, insult and malice and is associated with aggravating circumstances, such as willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, outrageous conduct, indignity, insult, fraud and gross fraud, thus warranting plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages, to be determined by the trier of fact.

Attorney's Fees

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attney's fees pursuant to 42 USC 1988. Since punitive damages are appropriate, counsel fees, internet access fees, computer and office equipment, paralegal fees and litigation fees can be taken into consideration when estimating the foregoing punitive damages.

Jury Demand

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.

Ad Dannum Clause

Based upon the foregoing pleaded facts, plaintiff prays for compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of Twenty Five Million Dollars ($25,000,000.00).

 

________________________________

Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 05-14-98

Sponsors
Shopping 		email
EMail 		Home
Home

Versus Law Legal Library
Case Law $7/Month 50 States + Fed
I use this service.

Copyright Terms

People before Lawyers

A project of the People's legal Front

-----