Plaintiff, as and for his complaint, alleges the following upon personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts, and upon information and belief as to all other matters. Plaintiff's information and belief is based, inter alia, on the investigation conducted by plaintiff and on the face of the court records and other public documents known to be true and accurate. Plaintiff believes that, in addition to the evidence contained in the court records themselves, substantial evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

This is a civil rights case brought under Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 1985(2) for violations of the Plaintiff's rights to due process of law under the 14^th Amendment of the United States Constitution and for obstruction of justice. Plaintiff contends that these Defendants conspired with State Actors acting under color of state law to undermine the Plaintiff's right to sue for damages to recover losses due to fraud and fraud upon the court.

The State Actors allowed defendants in the fraud case to act as legal counsel for other defendants in the same case. The state actors allowed individuals whom the plaintiff designated as witnesses to act as counsel. The defendants committed the crimes of perjury, filing of false affidavits, tampering with physical evidence, and tampering with a judicial process in order to conceal their fraud. The State Actors, which included two state judges and one federal judge, were tricked by these defendants who manipulated them into a conspiracy to conceal the criminal conduct so as to allow the defendants to avoid liability in a fraud case.

This suit involves conspiracy and criminal activity in two separate court cases. One case, Greene County Case number 197CC0170, will be referred to as "The State Case" or "The State Fraud Case". The other case, Federal Case number 98-3040-CV-S-3-RGC, was a federal civil rights case which will be referred herein as "The Federal Case" or "The Federal Civil Rights Case". The State Fraud Case 197CC0170 has been refiled as 198CC3100. In this new state case, Ms. Stringfellow, the Plaintiff's ex-wife, and Mr. Duncan are no longer parties to the suit. In this new state suit, the Plaintiff is suing Wear and Sharp for an entirely different set of facts than the ones presented here and that this case and the new State Case are not related.

Jurisdiction of this action is based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1331, 1331(a) and the Due Process Clause of Art. IV of the United States Constitution. This court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's common law claims, infra, and venue is proper pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391. The issue before this court is the violation of the Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 1985(2) and raises federal questions and constitutional issues.

This lawsuit is a refiling of the Federal Civil Rights Case, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the original suit included the Plaintiff's ex-wife as a party and was deemed by Judge Clark to be a domestic case. This case, unlike the original suit, does not include the Plaintiff's ex-wife as a party nor any issues relating to a divorce. This case is strictly about criminal conspiracy of lawyers, not in the divorce case, but in the State Fraud Case and Federal Civil Rights Case. It has also been reduced to be 100 paragraphs shorter so as to comply with Rule 8.

Plaintiff Marc Perkel is a citizen of the state of Missouri, Defendants are all citizens of the State of Missouri. The law firm defendants are law firms in Springfield Missouri. The Bar Plan is an insurance company located in St. Louis Missouri.

The facts contained herein in this section "In General" apply, and are hereby incorporated herein, to all of the facts and counts in this pleading.

1. James R. Sharp, Mo. Bar 35498 – is an attorney practicing law in Missouri. Mr. Sharp is a partner of Mr. Wear in the Law Firm of Wear and Sharp LLC.
2. William A. Wear Jr., Mo. Bar 23292 – is an attorney practicing law in Missouri. Mr. Wear is a partner of Mr. Sharp in the Law Firm of Wear and Sharp LLC.
3. The Law Firm of Wear and Sharp LLC - The law firm that employs Defendants Wear and Sharp. Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp are agents of this law firm and act in its behalf.
4. Donald R. Duncan, Mo. Bar 18542 – is an attorney practicing law in Missouri. Mr. Duncan is a member of the law firm of Turner, Reid, Duncan, Loomer, and Patton, P.C.
5. The law firm of Turner, Reid, Duncan, Loomer, and Patton, P.C. - The law firm that employs Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan is an agent for this firm and acts in behalf of the firm. That Mr. Duncan and his firm also represented "The Bar Plan" and acted as an agent and counsel for The Bar Plan.
6. The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Co., is an insurance company that sells legal malpractice insurance in Missouri. The Bar Plan sold malpractice insurance coverage to Defendants Wear, Sharp, Duncan, and their law firms. Defendant Duncan was retained by The Bar Plan to defend Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp.
7. Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp, representing the Law Firm of Wear and Sharp, appeared as counsel for their codefendant, Ms. Stringfellow in both the State and Federal cases. Mr. Duncan, representing his law firm, was hired by The Bar Plan and appeared as counsel for Defendants Wear, Sharp and their law firm in both the State and Federal cases. Mr. Duncan also appeared representing The Bar Plan in the Federal Case. In addition to representing Wear and Sharp and The Bar Plan, Mr. Duncan also appeared pro se and as counsel for his firm in both the State and Federal cases.
8. That at all times herein, that in the course of representing his clients, Mr. Duncan acted with full and accurate knowledge of his client's activities, and that the clients had full knowledge of their lawyers activities, and that all these lawyers and clients, with the exception of Ms. Stringfellow are lawyers and otherwise sophisticated clients fully educated in the law, and that their acts alleged herein were done knowingly, deliberately, maliciously, and that each party acted with the full knowledge and authority of the other parties involved.
9. Plaintiff further contends, that at all times herein, that the client/defendants involved, who are themselves lawyers or insurance companies, had both a right and a duty to control the activities of their respective lawyers. That any and all misconduct and/or criminal acts of these defendants, acting as lawyers, was done with the full knowledge and informed consent of the clients, and that these defendants knew or should have known that the alleged acts herein were improper or illegal.
10. Plaintiff contends that at all times herein that a meeting of the minds occurred, and that the acts were done in the furtherance of one or more conspiracies involving state actors, participating willfully and jointly, acting in their official capacities under color of state law. That these allegations of conspiracy involved two or more people. That there were unlawful acts involving both misdemeanors and felonies. That there existed one or more common goals, and/or mutually compatible goals, including but not limited to, avoiding liability, professional misconduct, criminal misconduct, and other misconduct by the State Actors. That the Plaintiff was denied his constitutional rights, and that the Plaintiff has suffered damages.
11. That there existed and still exists a motive for all lawyers, as well as judges in Missouri, to protect The Bar Plan from losing a significant lawsuit to a pro se litigant. Plaintiff contends that the Judiciary and the Bar fear that if a pro se is allowed to assert his constitutional rights and win a judgement against an attorney, that it will open up the door to other lawsuits similar lawsuits. This would undermine the improper constructive immunity that the Bar has created for itself preventing lawyers from being sued for damages. Plaintiff further contends that the State Actors mentioned here had a mutual understanding and acted in a conspiracy with these Defendants in the furtherance of the goal of preventing a pro se victory.
12. Plaintiff contends at all times herein that although he has no direct evidence at present of a deal between the Defendants and the State Actors, that the often bizarre behavior of the State Actors constitutes circumstantial evidence that a conspiracy existed. That with an opportunity for discovery, substantial evidentiary evidence will exist to convince jurors that an agreement existed between the Defendants and the State Actors.
13. Plaintiff further contends that there exists a custom in the Missouri Judiciary for judges to take advantage of pro se litigant's unfamiliarity with the rules of court, and that this was done to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff contends that judges consider pro se litigants to be inconvenient and it is customary for the courts to bend or break the rules to get rid of pro se cases. Plaintiff contends that this judicial custom is unconstitutional and asserts that an individual has the same due process rights regardless of his representation and that the courts have a constitutional duty to ensure that all citizens get equal access to justice whether represented by counsel or not. The Plaintiff however is more knowledgeable than most pro se litigants, and that during these two cases in question, that judicial misconduct occurred, and that at all times herein the State Actors had an additional motive for conspiring with these Defendants. That additional motive being to conceal professional misconduct on the part of the State Actors.
14. Plaintiff contends that at all times herein that the Defendants were aware of this judicial custom and that they took advantage of it to deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. That the Defendants, using their standing as attorneys and officers of the court, used these customs to entrap and victimize the State Actors, and to manipulate, corrupt, and entrap judges. That they created the appearance of judicial impropriety so as to cause these judges and State Actors to be threatened and/or seduced into participating unlawfully in a conspiracy with the Defendants.
15. That at all times herein, all State Actors were acting in their official capacity and acting under color of state law using the powers and authority of their office as granted to them under the Constitution and Statutes of the State of Missouri.
16. Plaintiff contends, that at all times herein, that the acts of the defendants constitute wanton and wicked conduct and were done willfully and maliciously.
17. That at all times herein that the Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and therefore his civil rights claims must be read expansively and that the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.

Defendants representing Defendants - Witnesses as Counsel

18. On January 15^th 1997, Plaintiff Marc Perkel filed a lawsuit naming as defendants Mr. Wear, Mr. Sharp, the Law Firm of Wear and Sharp, and the Plaintiff's ex-wife, Vicki Stringfellow (The State Case, Greene County Case: 197CC0170) alleging that these lawyers and Ms. Stringfellow defrauded the plaintiff in his divorce.
19. On January 23^rd 1997 Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Wear and Sharp as counsel for Defendant Stringfellow because they were defendants and were attempting to represent their codefendant, which isn't allowed under the rules.
20. On February 10^th 1997 Plaintiff filed a notice informing the defendants and the court that Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp would be called as a witness and, in said notice, informed them they would be in violation of Missouri Rule 3.7 if they continued to represent Defendant Stringfellow.
21. The judges of Greene County recused themselves and the Missouri Supreme Court appointed the Honorable William Syler to hear the case. The first hearing before Judge Syler was set to be held on July 14^th 1997.
22. On May 29^th 1997 Plaintiff filed another motion to disqualify counsel because of defendants representing defendants and asked Judge Syler for an immediate ruling. Judge Syler did not respond to Plaintiff's request for a ruling.
23. On June 2^nd 1997 the Plaintiff amended his pleading to include Mr. Duncan as a defendant alleging that Mr. Duncan broke the Rules of Court to help his clients execute a judgement obtained through fraud.
24. On June 26^th 1997, Plaintiff sent a "Notice of Intent to Depose" to all the Defendants and a copy to Judge Syler. In that notice Plaintiff informed the Defendants and the Court that he will depose Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp and that they will be material witnesses. This notice was the second notice that Wear and Sharp would be a witness. The Notice included a warning about their violation of Rule 3.7 prohibiting witnesses from being an advocate at trial.
25. On July 14^th 1997 a hearing was held to take up pending motions, the issue of improper representation was heard first. Ms. Stringfellow, in open court, was questioned by the judge and after testifying that she understood the consequences, that she knowingly and willingly waived conflict of interest with regards to her being represented by another defendant.
26. The Plaintiff cited case law to the court indicating that it is well established that conflict of interest can not be waived when it is known that a lawyer is going to be a witness. Plaintiff cited State of Missouri ex rel., v. The Honorable Frank Conley, 809 S.W.2d 405.
27. Although Judge Syler had actual knowledge that the Plaintiff would call Defendant Sharp as a witness, Judge Syler, with the expectation that Defendant Sharp would lie, nonetheless asked Defendant Sharp if he was going to be a witness. The fact that Judge Syler was asking a question for which everyone knew the answer to created a signal to Defendant Sharp that the judge expected him to lie so that he could improperly rule that a witness could act as counsel. In response Defendant Sharp, picked up on the judge's clue and a meeting of the minds occurred and a mutual understanding existed. Mr. Sharp knowingly and willfully lied to the court, as Judge Syler expected him to, and replied, "No". Judge Syler, acting as a judge under color of state law, ruled that although Mr. Sharp was himself a defendant, and in spite of conflict of interest rules and rules baring witnesses from acting as counsel, that Mr. Sharp could represent his codefendant, Ms. Stringfellow.
28. The Plaintiff objected to the ruling and asked the Court for an immediate appeal to certify the question with the Missouri Court of Appeals, stating to the court that to continue with improper representation would be meaningless. Judge Syler granted Plaintiff's motion to certify the question and suspended further proceedings pending a decision from the higher court on the issue of defendants representing defendants.
29. The Plaintiff took the question to the Missouri Court of Appeals who refused to decide the question. He then took it to the Missouri Supreme Court who also refused to decide the question. He then took it to the United States Supreme Court who also refused to decide the question.
30. On July 29^th 1997 Plaintiff filed his first motion to recuse Judge Syler on a number of issues including his decision to allow defendants and witnesses to represent other defendants in violation of the rules. Plaintiff's motion to recuse was denied without comment and without a hearing.
31. On September 9^th 1997 Plaintiff sent interrogatories to Defendant Sharp asking for the name of the court reporter who was to take Plaintiff's deposition on January 4^th 1995. This was a deposition that the Plaintiff was accused of failing to attend and for which the court sanctioned the Plaintiff and was one of the claims in the State Fraud Case. In response to the Plaintiff's interrogatory, Defendant Sharp on October 9^th 1997 revealed that he, in fact, had no court reporter present to take Plaintiff's deposition and thus perjured himself in violation of RSMo 575.040.

Perjury - Tampering with Physical Evidence

32. Upon information and belief, Defendant Duncan knew all along that Wear and Sharp had no court reporter present for the deposition. Nonetheless, Defendant Duncan perjured himself in violation of RSMo 575.040 filed several motions indicating that there was a deposition and that the Plaintiff missed it when he had actual knowledge that there was no deposition.
33. On October 20^th 1997 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgement against the defendants in the state fraud case. The motion stated the Defendants had committed fraud upon the court by having the Plaintiff sanctioned for not attending a deposition that never occurred. Plaintiff argued that since there was no court reporter present, there was no deposition.
34. On or about November 12^th 1997 Plaintiff wrote a letter to The Bar Plan. In that letter Plaintiff warned The Bar Plan that their insured, Wear and Sharp had revealed through interrogatories that they had no court reporter present to take the Plaintiff's deposition. The letter also warned them that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, was committing fraud upon the court by filing motions representing to the court that there was a deposition that the Plaintiff missed when he knew no deposition actually occurred. The letter also stated that if Mr. Duncan didn't know that there was no court reporter, he now does and had a duty to reveal this fraud to the court and take remedial action. The letter warned them that Mr. Duncan, acting as an agent for The Bar Plan, might be creating liability for them through his improper activities, and that they should look into it.
35. On November 18^th 1997 all defendants, in two separate but similar answers, one filed by Mr. Sharp and one filed by Mr. Duncan, responded to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgement
36. Both answers included Exhibit A and Exhibit B that are copies of faxes sent by the plaintiff. These exhibits are identical in both responses. Defendants altered Exhibit B to conceal the date that it was sent by crossing out the date of the fax with something similar to a thin tipped black Flair pen in violation of RSMo 575.100. However, the time of Exhibit B was left unaltered. Exhibit B was faxed on December 21^st 1994, however, in their responses both lawyers misrepresented the crossed out date as December 22^nd 1994. This change reversed the chronological order of Exhibit A and Exhibit B.
37. Plaintiff pointed out to Judge Syler, who has a duty to act, that he believed that Wear and Sharp committed a criminal act by Tampering with Physical Evidence (RSMo 575.100) and urged the court to take action against Wear and Sharp for their criminal conduct. Nonetheless, Judge Syler chose to ignore the criminal conduct of the defendants.
38. On November 26^th Plaintiff sent a second letter to The Bar Plan. In that letter Plaintiff informed The Bar Plan that their insured, Wear and Sharp, had tampered with physical evidence in violation of Missouri Statute Section 575.100, and that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, had proffered this evidence to the court knowing that his client had committed a crime. Plaintiff again warned The Bar Plan that their lawyer was committing fraud while acting as their agent. Nonetheless, The Bar Plan took no action to stop their lawyers misconduct.
39. On November 28^th 1997 the Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendants to take their deposition on December 19^th 1997. The Defendants had already acquiesced to discovery by answering two sets of interrogatories. On or about November 30^th, Defendants filed for a protective order to stop discovery.
40. On December 3^rd 1997 Judge Syler, in his role as judge, acting under color of state law in furtherance of the conspiracy, granted the Defendants' protective order and issued an order staying all discoveries. Judge Syler's protective order denied the Plaintiff his right to prosecute his case. The Plaintiff believes that Judge Syler intentionally shut down discovery to conceal criminal conduct in violation of RSMo 575.020 on the part of the Defendants.

False Affidavit

41. On December 8^th 1997 Plaintiff filed a second motion for summary judgement stating that the tampered evidence constituted a criminal act. Plaintiff argued that a criminal act can be construed as an admission by conduct that the defendants could not win the case on the merits entitling the Plaintiff to summary judgement. The Plaintiff urged the Court to take affirmative steps to deal with the defendants criminal conduct, including imposition of sanctions.
42. On January 6^th 1998 Defendants responded to Plaintiff's second motion for summary judgement. In their response Defendant Sharp stated, through his counsel Mr. Duncan, that he did not obliterate the date. He stated that he highlighted the date and that it photocopied to solid black, and then he lost the original. Mr. Sharp made these statements in a sworn affidavit before a notary public.
43. Based on scientific knowledge, information, and belief, Mr. Sharp's affidavit is in fact a false affidavit in violation of RSMo 575.050. Defendant Sharp's statement in his affidavit that a highlighter can photocopy to solid black is scientifically impossible. Mr. Sharp's has actual knowledge that his affidavit was in fact false. This affidavit was proffered to the court through his attorney, Defendant Duncan, who also knew that the affidavit was false.
44. On January 9^th 1998 Plaintiff wrote a third letter to The Bar Plan. In that letter Plaintiff informed them that their insured, Mr. Sharp, had made a false sworn affidavit and that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, had proffered the false affidavit to the court. The Bar Plan, having actual knowledge that their lawyer was breaking the law, again failed to respond to the Plaintiff or take any remedial action to stop their lawyer from acting in the furtherance of a fraudulent conspiracy when they had a right and a duty to do so.
45. In all three letters to The Bar Plan, the Plaintiff asked for a settlement. As an insurance company The Bar Plan has a duty to act in good faith and settle claims where they know they are clearly in the wrong.
46. On January 12^th 1998 Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants' response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgement. In his reply Plaintiff stated that a photocopy machine couldn't copy highlighted text as solid black and cited a number of facts that strongly indicated that Mr. Sharp's affidavit can not possibly be true. The reply contained a warning to Defendant Duncan that he had in fact proffered a false affidavit to the court and that he had a duty to take remedial action to avoid becoming a party to criminal conduct. The reply also contained a message to Judge Syler that he had a duty to refer the matter to the Prosecutor for a criminal investigation. The reply urged Judge Syler to stop covering up the criminal activity of these lawyers and to start doing his job.
47. Judge Syler ignored the Plaintiff's motion and took no action to deal with a prima facia case of Tampering with Physical Evidence, False Affidavit, and Perjury when he had a duty to do so. He did nothing in spite of the fact that this reply included a color test sheet using six colors of highlighters for the defendants to test to see if they could duplicate the solid black effect which Mr. Sharp claims. Plaintiff challenged the Defendant's and Judge Syler to photocopy the colored sheet to see for themselves that Defendant Sharp's claim is impossible. Plaintiff also included literature from the web sites of "Bic" and "Magic Marker" indicating that a feature of their highlighter products is that they don't show up on faxes or photocopies.

Second Motion to Recuse Judge Syler

48. On January 23^rd 1998 Plaintiff filed his Second Motion to Recuse Judge pursuant to Section 508.090 of the Missouri Code. In his motion to recuse, Plaintiff complained that Judge Syler, in failing to investigate possible criminal wrongdoing by the defendants, violated the Plaintiff's 14^th Amendment property rights and right to due process of law. That Judge Syler conduct violated his civil rights and a conspired to obstruct justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) of the federal code. Plaintiff complained Judge Syler violated Canon 1, Canon 2(a), Canon 3(a)(1), Canon 3(a)(3), Canon 3(a)(4), Canon 3(a)(5), and Canon 3(d)(1). Plaintiff complained that the Judge's impartiality might therefore be questioned.
49. Plaintiff's motion was not in affidavit form. Nonetheless, Judge Syler had a duty to recuse himself under these circumstances in order comply with the Canons of Judicial Conduct and to uphold the integrity of the judicial system. However, on January 26^th 1998 Judge Syler denied Plaintiff's second motion to recuse without comment and without a hearing.

Plaintiff files the Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit

50. On February 2^nd 1998 the Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against these defendants and Judge Syler. Although Judge Syler is an immune state actor, the Plaintiff sued him for a declaratory judgement and an injunction preventing him from acting as judge in the state suit and for an order of the federal court to cause him to recuse himself. The lawsuit also included Ms. Stringfellow as a defendant.
51. In the lawsuit the Plaintiff alleged most of the facts contained in this lawsuit. In the federal case the defendants appeared as in the State Fraud Case with defendants representing defendants. Assistant Attorney General Laura Vogel appeared as counsel for Judge Syler. The Honorable Judge Russell G. Clark was selected to hear the federal case.
52. The Plaintiff filed motions in federal court, again raising the issue that it was improper for defendants to represent other defendants and that it was improper for Judge Syler to be represented by the Attorney General. Plaintiff stated to the court that it was proper for the State to hire private counsel to represent Judge Syler and that the state might later have a conflict of interest in a criminal proceeding if the criminal charges were ever to be prosecuted. Nonetheless, Judge Clark took no action to consider the Plaintiff's motions.

More Conspiracy

53. Judge Syler scheduled a hearing to be held on April 17th 1998 in the underlying state fraud case to hear all pending motions. On April 1^st 1998 Plaintiff filed his third motion to recuse Judge Syler. This third motion to recuse was filed in affidavit form and was procedurally correct. The motion indicated that Judge Syler was to be called to the stand to be questioned as a witness. The rules and case law of Missouri require that when a litigant files a motion to recuse a judge in proper form, and the judge is going to be a witness, a second judge must hear the motion to recuse. Judge Cody Hanna from Dallas County was appointed to hear the motion to recuse. The Plaintiff was given no notice that a second judge was appointed or who the judge was. On April 17^th the hearing to recuse Judge Syler was held in Greene County Circuit Court.
54. Upon realizing that Judge Syler wasn't in the courtroom, Plaintiff asked Judge Hanna where Judge Syler was. Judge Hanna lied to the Plaintiff and indicated that he wasn't in the courtroom and indicated he didn't know where Judge Syler was.
55. Plaintiff told Judge Hanna that he wished to call Judge Syler to the stand as a witness. Judge Hanna responded that he wasn't in the courtroom and refused to order him produced. Judge Hanna asked if the Plaintiff has subpoenaed Judge Syler. Plaintiff responded that he hadn't, but that he didn't need to. Plaintiff argued that since Judge Syler had called the hearing, that the Plaintiff would reasonably expect the judge to be there. Plaintiff continued to assert his right to put Judge Syler on the stand indicating that he believed Judge Syler was hiding from the Plaintiff to avoid being examined as a witness.
56. Laura Vogel, who is an assistant to the Attorney General of Missouri, and who is representing Judge Syler in the Federal Lawsuit, made an improper appearance at the hearing in the State Case to recuse Judge Syler as Judge Syler's attorney. Laura Vogel is not a private attorney and she had no standing to appear and make an argument in behalf of Judge Syler in the State Case. In spite of the fact that Ms. Vogel represented Judge Syler, Ms. Vogel appeared and falsely claimed to speak in the capacity of friend of the court. Ms. Vogel stated that Judge Syler would appear in the courtroom to continue the proceeding based on the outcome of the recusal hearing.
57. Ms. Vogel argued that Judge Syler should not be required to appear as a witness in his own recusal hearing and stated in the alternative that if he is to testify, that the Plaintiff's questions should be censored and screened before the Plaintiff can ask them. Ms. Vogel stated to the Court that she could produce Judge Syler for questioning.
58. In spite of the Plaintiff's due process rights, Judge Hanna refused to allow the Plaintiff to call the Respondent Judge Syler to the stand to question him under oath about his decisions to conceal criminal conduct on the part of the Defendants, and why such a decision might cause a reasonable person would conclude that that his impartiality might be questioned.
59. Plaintiff pointed out to Judge Hanna that the rules require that a judge recuse if he has an interest in the outcome of the case and that the fact that Judge Syler was being sued constituted an interest in the outcome of the case. Plaintiff also pointed out that the standard of review was that if a reasonable person would question if the judge was capable of an impartial hearing, that he should recuse himself. Plaintiff then pointed out that the motion to recuse was to be construed liberally in favor of recusal so as to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the justice system. Plaintiff then applied the facts stating that when a judge allows defendants to represent defendants, shuts down discovery when criminal conduct is uncovered, and is being sued for obstruction of justice, that a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the judge. Plaintiff added that a judge has a duty to recuse himself on his own motion under these circumstances. Nonetheless, Judge Hanna ruled against the Plaintiff and allowed Judge Syler to continue to hear the case.
60. A recess was called and it was announced that after the recess, Judge Syler would hear the rest of the case. During the recess, the Plaintiff went to the Circuit Clerk and filed his dismissal of the case. The Plaintiff had prepared dismissal papers in the event that Judge Hanna was part of the conspiracy failed to uphold the law and recuse Judge Syler. The Plaintiff dismissed the case at that time for the purpose of denying Judge Syler jurisdiction. The Plaintiff feared that Judge Syler would continue to abuse his judicial authority and undermine the Plaintiff's right to due process of law.

The Conspiracy moves to Federal Court

61. In federal court, Judge Clark issued an order indicating that the Plaintiff's federal lawsuit failed to sufficiently allege conspiracy. The decision indicated that Defendants' motion to dismiss was to be construed as a motion for summary judgement. The order indicated that the Plaintiff should indicate why he should not grant the Defendants summary judgement.
62. In response, the Plaintiff amended his pleading to sufficiently allege conspiracy and incorporated additional facts of conspiracy based on events that occurred at the April 17^th 1998 hearing in state court. An order was also issued asking the Plaintiff why the decision of the state case should not be considered res judicata in the federal case. Plaintiff responded that he dismissed the state case resulting in no decision for the federal court to rely on. Plaintiff dismissed Judge Syler as a party to the federal case since the recusal was now moot.
63. Judge Clark dismissed the federal lawsuit without prejudice deciding that it was a domestic case and that he lacked jurisdiction. Judge Clark also ruled that the pleading was too long and didn't comply with Rule 8. Plaintiff however contends that since Judge Clark ruled that he lacked jurisdiction, he therefore did not have the jurisdiction to rule that the Plaintiff's pleading didn't comply with Rule 8.
64. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the appeal he dismissed Ms. Stringfellow as a defendant and argued that the case was not a domestic case. The Plaintiff however dismissed the appeal on the basis of judicial economy choosing to refile the case here in this court rather (this case) than to amend his pleading to remove the claims against his ex-wife, and to ensure the case wasn't sent back to Judge Clark.
65. Plaintiff believes that Judge Clark, in allowing defendants to represent defendants, and in allowing the Office of the Attorney General to improperly represent Judge Syler, and to fail to act on the Plaintiff's injunction to recuse Judge Syler in the state case, and to ignore the criminal activity of these Defendants, and to conceal the misconduct of Judge Syler, Judge Hanna, and Assistant Attorney General Vogel, and to protect the insurance funds of The Bar Plan, and in order to prevent a pro se litigant from wining a significant suit against attorneys, acted in furtherance of the conspiracy in behalf of these Defendants in order to protect these defendants from liability and the State Actors from disciplinary proceedings.

Counts

1. Fraud - All Defendants - Plaintiff respectfully contends that when tested against standards of fraud as specified in foregoing paragraphs, the challenged conduct constitutes fraud and fraud upon the court.
2. Fraudulent Conspiracy - All Defendants - Plaintiff respectfully contends that when tested against the standards of conspiracy as specified on the foregoing paragraphs, the challenged conduct constitutes a fraudulent conspiracy to violate the Plaintiff's protected constitutional rights including the right to due process of law.
3. Perjury, False Affidavit - Defendant Sharp - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the affidavit of Defendant Sharp is a false affidavit and is in violation of Missouri Statutes 575.040 and 575.050.
4. Suborning Perjury - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate the Defendants either directly committed perjury or supported the other Defendants in their act of committing perjury.
5. Tampering with Physical Evidence - Defendants Wear and Sharp - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that these defendants altered evidence and proffered the altered evidence to the court in violation of Missouri Statute 575.100. Plaintiff respectfully contends that Defendant Duncan proffered this evidence to the court knowing that Defendants Wear and Sharp altered it.
6. Tampering with a Judicial Proceeding - All Defendants - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that these defendants, conspiring together, engaged in conduct that was reasonably calculated to entrap and seduce judges to commit acts, or appear to commit acts, of impropriety; and for the purpose of influencing the official actions of judges in violation of RSMo 575.260, in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional right of due process of law.
7. Concealing Criminal Conduct - Defendant Duncan, The Bar Plan - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Defendant Duncan and The Bar Plan concealed a criminal offense pursuant to RSMo 575.020.
8. Legal Malpractice - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendants' conduct constitutes legal malpractice.
9. Tort of Bad Faith - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that The Bar Plan has committed a Tort of Bad Faith against the Plaintiff.
10. Party to the Conspiracy - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that The Bar Plan is a party to the conspiracy because they had actual knowledge of the misdeeds of their attorney and the insured defendants and failed to act to prevent further criminal conduct when they were warned three times and had a duty to act. The defendant lawyers broke the law and conspired with state actors with The Bar Plan's full knowledge and approval.
11. Professional Misconduct - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendant lawyers violated numerous rules of professional conduct as well as breaking laws that carry the penalty of Class D felony and Class A misdemeanors.
12. Hiding a Witness - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Judge Hanna conspired with Judge Syler, Laura Vogel, and the Defendants to conceal a witness for the purpose of depriving the Plaintiff of his right to due process of law, to prevent the Plaintiff from calling Judge Syler to the stand to testify and ultimately forcing Plaintiff to dismiss his State lawsuit.
13. Interfering with a Judicial Process - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that Laura Vogel, in her official capacity as Assistant Attorney General made an improper appearance in the hearing to recuse Judge Syler and interfered with the Plaintiff's right to due process of law. Plaintiff contends that Laura Vogel had no standing to appear in this case and acted with these defendants in a conspiracy to deny the Plaintiff his rights to due process of law.
14. Denial of Due Process - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the Defendants conspired with state actors under color of law to deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected right to due process of law pursuant to Title 42 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Code.
15. Obstruction of Justice - Plaintiff respectfully contends that the foregoing facts indicate that the defendants conspired with Judge Syler, Judge Hanna, Judge Clark, and Laura Vogel to obstruct justice within the meaning of Title 42 USC § 1985(2).

Relief

Declaratory Relief

1. Plaintiff asks the court to rule that it is improper for defendants to represent other defendants.
2. Plaintiff asks the court to rule that Defendants' conduct appears to constitutes several criminal acts and should be investigated by a prosecutor.
3. Plaintiff asks the court to rule that the conduct of the defendants constitutes professional misconduct and recommend that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel initiate an investigation.
4. Court costs should be assessed to Defendants.

Injunctive Relief

1. This court should make an immediate order preventing defendants from even attempting to represent other defendants before this court, and this court should issue orders sanctions sua sponte if the defendants attempt to undermine the Plaintiff's due process rights before this court.

Plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages, the amount of which is still accruing. Defendants' above described conduct has effected plaintiff to the extent that;

1. it has injured him emotionally, causing him mental suffering, loss of sleep, depression, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, anger, mortification, shock, memory loss, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, and paranoia, uncertainty, apprehension; and,
2. as well as incurring him the expenses of litigation, it has required thousands of hours of his time and energy to learn the law and for research and writing to defending himself, sufficient time and energy to preclude him from procuring other work as a computer programmer, writing software, keeping his software current, running his business and having a normal social life; and,
3. it has caused him to suffer a lack of concentration that has resulted in an inability to perform his job, and as a result he has been unable to write new programs to market and keep competitive and stay current with computer technology. As a result, he has had to lay off 4 of his 5 employees, lost his market share, caused him to fail to keep up with current technology, caused him to get behind on loans, destroyed his credit rating, caused him to not be able to afford to advertise his products, lost the value of his software copyrights (which Defendants have valued at $750,000), and has virtually destroyed his software company. That Plaintiff has suffered severe and permanent damage to his ability to earn a living as a computer programmer; and,
4. damaged his reputation as a programmer and a business owner, loss of identity and standing in the world of nerds, caused him to be embarrassed and shamed before his customers because his company could no longer meet the software needs of his customer base; and,
5. loss of his career leaving the Plaintiff wondering what he will do for a living and in need of retraining in order to become competitive in the field of computer software; and,
6. it has impaired his ability to engage in recreational, family, dating, travel, and social activities, and has resulted in a loss of his enjoyment due to his inability to engage in such activities; and,
7. destroyed his faith and trust in the American judicial system, causing him to believe that lawyers and judges can break the rules with impunity and get away with it; and,
8. it has destroyed his motivation to earn a living because he believes anything he earns will be taken away from him. Plaintiff fears that he will end up broke and homeless and that he will lose all his property and his vehicle and will be put out on the street. He lives in fear that he will be incarcerated for contempt of court for standing up for his constitutional rights and,
9. it is at present causing him emotional pain and suffering and he anticipates permanent emotional pain and suffering from it. That he anticipates that he will never again be able to function as a normal member of society, and
10. Plaintiff suffers permanent damage from legal abuse syndrome.

This case involves attorney misconduct to and extent that it undermines the ability of the courts to function. The misconduct of the attorneys Wear and Sharp started in 1994 and continues to this day. Since then their misconduct has resulted in almost 20 civil actions having been filed in every level of state and federal court up to and including the United States Supreme Court. Throughout this process there has been a common theme, that being a level of dishonesty that staggers the imagination. Now they have degenerated to criminal conduct and criminal conspiracy to conceal their misdeeds. In order to protect themselves that have involved several members of the judiciary in their misconduct as well as the Missouri Bar and the Office of Attorney General. Their continued misconduct with this plaintiff and others have directly led to the creation of at least four organizations, People before Lawyers, People’s Legal Front, Parents United as One, and the Springfield branch of the Children’s Rights Council, all critical of the Missouri Bar and the Missouri Judiciary. Wear and Sharp were the law firm that inspired the creating of Senate Bill 910 which gave parents the right to bring child custody cases in family court pro se to prevent parents from being raped by lawyers like Wear and Sharp.

When lawyers are allowed to commit criminal acts and seduce state actors into participating with them so as to conceal their own misconduct, it hurts all lawyers and the judiciary and causes the judicial branch to lose the confidence of the public. It causes lawyers and judges to be held in public disdain and ridicule. The damage to society at the hands of these lawyers has been enormous and therefore punitive damages are appropriate in order to set and example so as to discourage other lawyers from committing criminal acts such as perjury, tampering with evidence, false affidavits, and Interfering with a Judicial Process in a court of law and expecting to have judges allow them to get away with it.

Recently a federal judge in Little Rock held the President of the United States, a defendant in a civil lawsuit, in contempt for misleading the court about sexual issues in a deposition in a case the same judge later dismissed. These lawyers committed criminal acts in their capacity as officers of the court acting before a tribunal, and for the purpose of obstructing justice. Should a local lawyer enjoy more immunity before the federal courts that the President of the United States? Punitive damages are therefore appropriate.

Defendants' conduct as described above is willful, intentional and malicious resulting from fraud, insult and malice and is associated with aggravating circumstances, such as willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, outrageous conduct, indignity, insult, fraud, and criminal conduct, thus warranting plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages, to be determined by the trier of fact.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 USC 1988. Since punitive damages are appropriate, counsel fees, internet access fees, computer and office equipment, expert witness fees, paralegal fees and litigation fees can be taken into consideration when estimating the foregoing punitive damages.

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Based upon the foregoing pleaded facts, plaintiff prays for compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of Twenty Five Million Dollars ($25,000,000.00).

Or, in the alternative, that this court find that Wear and Sharp should be disbarred and Wear and Sharp leave the Bar permanently, that Mr. Duncan and his firm be investigated to determine if their participation in representing Wear and Sharp requires discipline, and compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of five hundred thousand ($500,000).

________________________________

Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 04-22-99