Response - Vicki's Motion to Dismiss

              IN THE CIRCUIT COURT GREENE COUNTY MISSOURI


Marc Perkel - pro se              )
         plaintiff,               )
                                  )
vs.                               )  No. 197CC0170
                                  )
William A. Wear Jr.               )
James R. Sharp                    )
The Law Firm of Wear and Sharp    )
Vicki Stringfellow                )
Donald A. Duncan - pro se         )
The Law Firm of Turner, Reid,     )
Duncan Loomer and Patton, P.C.,   )
         defendants,              )



                     SUGGESTIONS IN OPPOSITION TO
            SEPARATE MOTION OF DEFENDANT VICKI STRINGFELLOW
                TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED PETITION
            ===============================================

Plaintiff now responds to the motion filed by Mr. Sharp representing Ms.
Stringfellow. Plaintiff still does not recognize the standing of Mr.
Sharp to represent this codefendants. However, Plaintiff responds in
case the Court should rule incorrectly and allow this improper
representation to continue. THIS RESPONSE SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS
ACCEPTANCE OF MR. SHARP'S IMPROPER REPRESENTATION OR A WAIVER OF ANY
RIGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF TO OBJECT TO MR. SHARP'S STANDING BEFORE THE
COURT.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the same arguments that he made in
opposition to the motion to dismiss of defendants Wear, Sharp and the
The Law Firm of Wear and Sharp and his arguments in opposition of Mr.
Duncan's motion to dismiss. In addition, new arguments here may apply to
the other defendants as well.


The Appeal
----------

Mr. Sharp states that the underlying divorce case is currently on
appeal. Plaintiff admits this, however it is irrelevant to this case. As
Mr. Sharp knows, the Court of Appeals is a court that fixes errors in
judgements. In that court I can bring up issues of error in the form of
points on appeal saying for example, "The Court erred in doing X because
of reason Y." This case has no jurisdiction to review the case on the
basis of error. It can only void the judgement on the basis of fraud.

On the other hand, I am suing Ms. Stringfellow for fraud and conspiracy
to commit fraud upon the court as well as suing her lawyer and now her
lawyer's lawyer. I'm suing for actual and punitive damages. These issues
are outside the scope of the Appellate Court. Although some of the
underlying facts are the same and both actions originated from the same
divorce, these cases are quite different.

Besides, this issue has already been brought before the court of Appeals.
In that motion Mr. Sharp made the opposite argument that both cases
should proceed at the same time. He is now estopped from arguing the
opposite position.

The Court in it's order sited Feilder v. Fielder which indicates these
two cases are not mutually exclusive and allowed the appeal to continue
in spite of this action.


Fraud upon the Court
--------------------

Mr. Sharp contends that when a lawyer, who is an officer of the court,
lies to a judge and asks for and wins sanctions against a pro se
defendant that Rule 74.06 doesn't apply. Perhaps Mr. Sharp doesn't
understand the difference between perjury and fraud upon the court.

Perjury is where a client or witness lies on the stand. It is presumed
that the judge and jury can sort out who's lying and who's telling the
truth. Although perjury is illegal, it is not enough by itself to
overturn a judgement in some cases.

However, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound by oath and
the Rules of Professional Conduct to be honest and candid with the
tribunal. (Rule 3.3) When a lawyer speaks in court, as an officer of the
court, it is presumed he is telling the truth. His word as an officer of
the court carries more weight than the words of an unknown pro se
litigant and the court is therefore obligated to believe the lawyer over
that of someone like me.

Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition id. at 457 defines "Fraud on Court"
as:

   "[Fraud on Court] consists of conduct so egregious that it undermines
   the integrity of the judicial process."

This is why we have Rule 74.06(d) which specifically provides relief
from judgement for fraud upon the court. This protects the integrity of
the judicial process for lawyers who would lie to the court.

Fraud on the Court is where a lawyer, as an officer of the court, lies
to the court about a material fact. In this case Mr. Sharp, while
representing Ms. Stringfellow, who hasn't denied her knowledge and
consent, told the court that I failed to attend a deposition that never
existed. I have also alleged that Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear participated
with Ms. Stringfellow in preparing fabricated evidence for Judge McGhee
to rely on in the division of property.

If Ms. Stringfellow by herself, without the knowledge of her lawyers
fabricated evidence that her lawyers unknowingly proffered to the court
as true, then it would be intrinsic fraud. If this were the case then
his site of "Stein v. Stein" would apply. But that's not what I've
alleged here. I alleged that her lawyers actively participated in the
fabrication of the false evidence and proffered it to the court knowing
it was false. That's fraud upon the court.

The court in Sutter v. Easterly (Mo) 189 SW2d 284, articulated the
general rule defining fraud on the court within the courts of Missouri:

   "... Where a lawyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fraud upon
   the court by the production of fabricated evidence and by such means
   obtains a judgement then the enforcement of the judgement becomes
   manifestly unconscionable' and a court of equity may devitalize the
   judgement." Id, at 288.

In Sutter it was concluded by the Court that:

   "Peters' scheme and conspiracy were such a violation of a lawyer's
   duty to the court --- a duty imposed not alone by the principles of
   honesty and good morals but also by a code of ethics adopted as rules
   of court, as to amount to a fraud on the court for which equity will
   grant relief."

Mr. Sharp seem to be claiming that since the judge believed his lie that
res judicata applies. If that were so then Rule 74.06 would be
meaningless because it would apply to all cases of fraud.

Since I have alleged fraud upon the court, and sufficient facts to
support fraud upon the court, and Rule 74.06(d) allows for relief based
on fraud upon the court, I have stated a claim for which relief can be
granted.


Fraudulent Garnishments
-----------------------

Since I am already suing Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp for fraud it seems
reasonable to me that his additional fraud of taking money due my
corporation be added to this cause of action.



Standards of Honesty
--------------------

The defendants in this case seem to be making an argument that lawyers
have a right to be dishonest and deceitful. It is as if to make a
mockery of the Rules of Professional Conduct. They argue essentially
that "If we lie to the judge and he believes the lies, then res
judicata." They seem to think it's OK to fabricate false evidence and to
encourage clients to testify falsely, after all, everybody does it. I
think they're used to getting away with it because lawyers allow lawyers
to break the rules and judges have shown a high tolerance for
dishonesty from lawyers. But just because they may have gotten away with
it in the past is no reason to allow them to continue to do so.

Now these lawyers come before the court in a chorus line of defendants
representing other defendants, lawyers as witnesses, lawyers
representing five defendants, lawyers pro se, and they expect the court
to allow this because they obviously expect to get away with it. They
are so confident that the court is going to take care of them that they
don't even bother to file responses to my motions or to file timely
motions to dismiss.

I will admit as Mr. Sharp once accused me of in front of Judge McGhee
that I am arrogant. I'm not the kind of guy that judges like in their
courtroom. I don't look good, I don't dress well. And although I don't
intend to be intentionally disrespectful, I have a high IQ, a bad
attitude, and people of authority tend to find me offensive. I've been
treated badly by the courts and I'm not a nice guy. However, some of my
best friends are lawyers and judges and I don't lump people into
categories. I have no history with you, your honor, and all I ask for is
a fair hearing. Just because I may be offensive doesn't mean I'm not
entitled to justice.

I have some apprehension coming before this court for several reasons.
I've been through hell with the courts the last three years. But that's
history and like I said, you have a clean slate in my mind. I have no
expectation that you will be either honest or dishonest. However, I'm
not sure that's true for my opponents.

Here we have a situation, your honor, where we have lawyers who are
breaking the rules with impunity, and they are doing so in your court.
It amazes me that they are even trying to get away with the things they
are pulling here. It makes me wonder, your honor, on what basis they
feel they can get away with it.

It looks to me, your honor, that there is an expectation on their part
that you are going to take care of them. They seem to be acting with
confidence that they already know what the outcome is going to be. How
can they even attempt these things unless they already know you are
going to let them get away with it? Assuming their expectations are
unfounded, I would find it insulting and disturbing that they would
expect you to behave improperly on their behalf.

I'm inspired by the movie, "Mr. Smith goes to Washington". I'm a Jimmy
Stewart fan and I mourned his passing yesterday. I feel moved, your
honor, to make the kind of candid, honest, and open kind of argument
that Jimmy Stewart would have made. I suppose one has to believe that
justice will ultimately prevail. Someone has got to protect and preserve
the integrity of the judicial system.


Attorney's Fees
---------------

If Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear want attorney's fees he should present the
Plaintiff with a detailed accounting of the charges he is asking for
before the hearing on the 14th.



WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, while not acknowledging that Mr. Sharp even has
standing to make a motion in behalf of his codefendants, respectfully
asks the court to DENY defendants motion to dismiss and grant the
Plaintiff sanctions and whatever other relief the court deems necessary.



__________________________________
Marc Perkel * Plaintiff * 07-03-97