IN THE CIRCUIT COURT GREENE COUNTY MISSOURI


Marc Perkel - pro se              )
         plaintiff,               )
                                  )
vs.                               )  No. 197CC0170
                                  )
William A. Wear Jr.               )
James R. Sharp                    )
The Law Firm of Wear and Sharp    )
Vicki Stringfellow                )
Donald A. Duncan - pro se         )
The Law Firm of Turner, Reid,     )
Duncan Loomer and Patton, P.C.,   )
         defendants,              )



        MOTION TO STRIKE APPEARANCE AND ENTER DEFAULT JUDGEMENT
               AGAINST DONALD A. DUNCAN AND HIS LAW FIRM
        -------------------------------------------------------

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Marc Perkel and asks the court to strike the
motions and the appearance of Mr. Duncan who appears pro se and as
counsel representing his law firm, and as the attorney for Mr. Wear, Mr.
Sharp, and the Law Firm of Wear and Sharp. His appearance should be
stricken on the basis that the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7
prohibits Mr. Duncan from representing these defendants in this action
while representing himself and his law firm at the same time.

Plaintiff also asks the court to enter a default judgement against Ms.
Stringfellow for not appearing to answer the pleading. In support of his
motion Pliantiff states as follows:

1) That the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 prohibits
   representing opposing parties in litigation and states:

      "Lawyer's Interest. The lawyer's own interests should not be
      permitted to have an adverse effect on the representation of a
      client."

      "Conflict in litigation. Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of
      opposing parties in litigation. Simultaneous representation of
      parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as
      co-plaintiff or co-defendants is governed by paragraph (b). An
      impermissable conflict may exist by reason of substantial
      discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in
      positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there
      are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the
      claims or liabilities in question."

2) That these parties are all lawyers and know or should know that they
   are breaking the rules. The Plaintiff is pro se and he knows what the
   rules are. These defendants are seasoned lawyers, they went to law
   school and have a degree. They passed the Missouri Bar exam. They
   therefore are estopped from claiming they don't already know that
   this representation is a deliberate attempt to tamper with the
   administration of justice and to undermine the judicial process and
   deny the plaintiff and other defendants their due process rights to a
   fair and impartial hearing. Plaintiff contends that the conduct of
   Mr. Duncan shows a deliberate and contumacious disregard for the
   authority of the court. (Fredco Reality Inc. v. Jones, 904 S.W.2d 818
   Mo. Ct. App. 1995)

3) That because the representation is prohibited, that Mr. Duncan has no
   standing to answer pleadings or to make motions in behalf of himself
   while simultaneously claiming that he also represents his
   codefendants. Therefore, the court should strike his motions and
   treat them as if they never existed and he failed to appear.

4) In his motions and suggestions it is unclear if Mr. Duncan is
   speaking in his own defense or in the defense of his client. He
   maintains a triple role as defendant, witness and advocate which is
   strictly prohibited by Rules 1.7 and 3.7. Mr. Duncan appears as five
   seperate legal persons; as attorney for Mr. Wear, as attorney for Mr.
   Sharp, as attorney for the Law Firm of Wear and Sharp, as attorney
   for his own lawfirm and finally as a pro se litigant representing
   himself.

5) Since Mr. Duncan and his firm have failed to appear to defend
   themselves, the Plaintiff is entitled to default judgement.

6) Mr. Duncan's clients, Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear have already
   demonstrated why one defendant representing another should be
   prohibited. Mr. Sharp and Mr. Wear have failed to file an answer to
   Plaintiff's amended petition within the time allotted and their
   client, Ms. Stringfellow, is now in default.

7) Since Mr. Duncan has already delayed this proceeding for six months
   he should be denied time to obtain different counsel and file a
   responsive pleading or motion. If Mr. Duncan wants to respond he
   should insist his client/codefendant get proper counsel now, that he
   get proper counsel now, and file a response according to the rules
   and do so within the time frame allowed under Rule 44. If Mr. Duncan,
   Mr. Wear and Mr. Sharp knowingly and deliberately break the rules
   they should suffer the consequences.

8) The Plaintiff is sure that if he were to tamper with the Rules the
   way that the defendants are doing that the court wouldn't hesitate to
   grant a default judgement against him. Plaintiff contends that what's
   good for the goose is good for the gander.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, having given the defendants plenty of warning
about the improper representation and tampering with the administration
of justice, prays for an order of the court striking the appearance of
Mr. Duncan and his Firm and to enter a default judgement against Mr.
Duncan and his Law Firm in favor of the Plaintiff.