On September 8^th 1998 at or about 10:30pm, the plaintiff, Marc Perkel was arrested in his home by officers Kevin Hollie and Kent Shipley. The plaintiff was arrested without a warrant. The officers searched the plaintiff's home without a search warrant and without permission to do so. The plaintiff requested to know the charges against him and was denied. The officers attempted to question the plaintiff about his friend Mr. Slack and the plaintiff made it clear that he wasn't going to answer their questions.

Plaintiff was then hauled to the Springfield City Jail where he was imprisoned in the intoxication tank. Plaintiff was informed that he was being arrested for trespassing. Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to make bail or to call an attorney. The bail was $100 and the plaintiff had $200 in cash on his person at the jail. Nonetheless, plaintiff was imprisoned for 10 hours against his will.

Plaintiff then filed a complaint against the arresting officers with the Springfield Police Internal Affairs department. The defendant officer Robert Greer decided the complaint was "unfounded". The plaintiff requested reconsideration and noted in the official police report that the officers admitted that they had arrested the plaintiff in his home without a warrant and that according to the officers own version of the events, that the officers committed a serious breach of conduct and had violated the rights of the plaintiff. Nonetheless, officer Greer continued to cover up for the officers and refused to take appropriate action.

Plaintiff then filed a complaint against officer Greer for concealing the misdeeds of his fellow officers. Plaintiff also requested review from defendant Police Chief Lynn Rowe. Police Chief Rowe reviewed the matter and confirmed that the officers behaved within the customs and policies of the Springfield Police Department.

Plaintiff was charged with the crime of trespassing under city code 26.152. Plaintiff was arraigned in municipal court and pled not guilty. Plaintiff then scheduled depositions and within an hour of the time the officers were to be deposed, the City informed the plaintiff that charge of trespassing was being dropped.

The police report contained several pages of information about Mr. Slack's case and accused the plaintiff of hundreds of illegal sex acts with prostitutes, perverted behavior, sex without condoms implying that the plaintiff had a loathsome disease, and other statement that were untruthful and designed to embarrass and humiliate the plaintiff, who was at the time the Democratic candidate for the United States House of Representatives.

On at least three occasions the plaintiff delivered to each member of City Council and the City Manager a complaint about these civil rights violations. These complaints were extremely detailed and asked City Council to intervene and take action to stop the violations of the plaintiff's rights and the rights of the citizens of Springfield. Plaintiff stated that the problem was widespread and that they had a duty to use their supervisory authority to stop the abuses. Plaintiff included case law in his presentations and eventually threatened to sue the City and even presented them with his legal arguments and sited case law as to how they would be liable. Nonetheless, in spite of all this, the City Manager and the Council showed nothing more than deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's complaints.

Although the plaintiff was charged with trespassing, the real reason the plaintiff was arrested was that he was an associate of Mr. Slack, who was being investigated for 2^nd degree promotion of prostitution. The police and the defendant prosecutors were working together as a team in order to gather evidence against Mr. Slack. The plaintiff was known to the officers and to the prosecutors in that the plaintiff helped arrange for bail for Mr. Slack, had worked with Mr. Slack's attorneys to do legal research to prepare a defense, and had appeared as a spectator in court with Mr. Slack. The plaintiff's name appeared in the testimony of state's witnesses along with the names of two Greene County judges and a family court commissioner who were alleged by state witnesses to be patrons of Mr. Slack's escort business.

During this investigation, many people who were associated with Mr. Slack were arrested on bogus charges in violation of their civil rights for the purpose of harassing and intimidating them into giving the investigative team information to convict Mr. Slack and his associates. Plaintiff contends that this team targeted the plaintiff as a person whom may have possessed information that would be of value to their effort to convict Mr. Slack. Plaintiff contends that this team made the decision to arrest the plaintiff on the fabricated charge of trespassing in order to force him to disclose information of a private nature about conversations between Mr. Slack and his legal counsel.

Plaintiff contends that there was a chain of command, and that the arresting officers were at the bottom of that chain and that they were acting as part of this team. Plaintiff believes that defendant Sgt. Routh was the immediate commanding officer, and that Sgt. Routh answered to Chief Rowe and to defendant prosecutor Dan Patterson and to defendant prosecutor Ron Carrier, all of which were part of this team investigating Mr. Slack. Plaintiff believes that the decisions of the team were made collectively and that the arresting officers were acting, not alone, but as part of this team. Plaintiff contends that the plaintiff's arrest and subsequent prosecution was an act of the team in a conspiracy to work together in violation of the law to convict Mr. Slack by any means necessary, without regard for the law, no matter what they had to do to get the job done.

The case law is quite clear on the subject of prohibiting warrantless arrests in the home. The landmark Supreme Court case of Payton V. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 states:

There isn't any question in this case as to the facts. The question before this court is, does a citizen in Springfield Missouri have any rights under the United States Constitution. It is clear that based on the positions of the defendants, that they clearly believe that the Constitution doesn't apply to Springfield Missouri. That is the issue before this court. Can a police officer just decide they are going to throw someone in jail for not cooperating with their investigations? These defendants think so. The lawyers for the arresting officers and the city council contend in their answers to the pleading that the constitutional rights of the plaintiff are frivolous.

A person doesn't have rights just because some piece of paper says he has them. What gives a person rights is if he can go to the government and have his rights enforced. There is no doubt whatsoever that what the police did was clearly wrong. One would have thought that when the Internal Affairs department found out that their officers were arresting people in their home without a warrant, that they would have been outraged. The Internal Affairs department determined that the plaintiff's complaint was "unfounded" and maintained that position even after the plaintiff sent them the Supreme Court case law and pointed out that the arresting officers admit in their own police report that they arrested the plaintiff in his home without a warrant.

Clearly under these circumstances it is evident that the Internal Affairs Department is very comfortable with flaunting the Constitution and the rights of the citizens to cover up for the police. The plaintiff then filed an Internal Affairs complaint against Sgt. Greer for covering up police misconduct, and that complaint was ignored. The plaintiff brought this these issues to the attention of Police Chief Lynn Rowe, documenting in detail what had happened and giving him the Supreme Court cases about warrantless arrests in the home and the police report showing that his officers had, in fact, made such a warrantless arrest. In spite of all this, Chief Rowe joined the coverup and asserted that the officers behaved properly. Apparently Chief Rowe believes he has the authority to set aside the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and suspend the Constitution.

Apparently Chief Rowe does have this authority. The plaintiff took his problem to the City Manager, the Mayor, and City Council, and again provided them with all the details of what was going on in their police department. They weren't interested. They did nothing. The plaintiff contacted City Council three times. At least three members of City Council are lawyers. The plaintiff provided them with the case law and they still ignored it. The plaintiff even threatened to sue the city and the council members and sent them the case law cites making them liable and even gave them legal arguments he would use should he have to sue, and they still did nothing. City Council made a deliberate decision to be indifferent to these complaints and to allowed these violations of the plaintiff's civil rights to continue.

Why did the arresting officers think they could get away with arresting the plaintiff in his home without a warrant? Why did they believe they could get away with searching his home without a warrant? Why did they believe they could throw the plaintiff in jail without allowing him to make bond? Why did they believe that they could file false charges? Are they so poorly trained that they don't know you can't arrest a person in his home without a warrant? Is the Internal Affairs Department so poorly trained that they don't know what the law is? Do we have a Chief of Police that doesn't have a clue as to how to make a legal arrest? Or does there exist a culture in the City of Springfield where everyone lets everyone else get away with everything and nobody really gives a damn what the law is. Springfield apparently isn't part of the United States and we do things our way down here. Apparently our local government thinks that civil rights is some "Washington thing" and when a citizens civil rights are violated, City Council contends to this court that the plaintiff's constitutional rights are frivolous. How dare they! How dare they!

If the police can arrest a person in his home without an arrest warrant, then what is the purpose of an arrest warrant? Why do we even need judges or prosecutors if we are going to allow the police to perform those roles? This suit involves a greater issue than the plaintiff spending a brief period in the city drunk tank. This suit is about whether or not the citizens of Springfield Missouri have constitutional rights. That's why it is necessary for the court to order punitive damages so that these defendants and the City of Springfield will get the message that they are indeed part of the United States of America, that civil rights are not trivial and frivolous issues, and that the police can not drag a person out if his or her home in the middle of the night without getting a warrant.

Police misconduct hurts the police department and puts officers at risk for the misconduct of others. It sets bad examples and turns good cops into bad cops or causes good cops to quit and seek other work. It reflects badly on law enforcement in general. It causes the public to lose respect for the police force.

When the government acts in a lawless manner, the citizens lose respect for the government and the law. In the case of Elkins Et Al. V. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 the court stated:

Plaintiff contends that the arresting officers are directly liable having been the individuals who actually did the dirty deeds. Plaintiff contends that the police must surely be trained as to when and where you can make an arrest and how to get an arrest warrant. It is well settled in law that a person can sue under the civil rights laws for false arrest, illegal search, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and liable and slander.

Plaintiff make no claim of liability under the respondeat superior theory and admits that such a theory would fail. Plaintiff sues defendants Routh, Rowe, Patterson, and Carrier under the theory that they were working as a team and that they conspired together and made decisions to act against the plaintiff that were carried out by the arresting officers. Plaintiff's liability theory is that although the arresting officers violated the plaintiff's civil rights, these other defendants gave the orders to do the deeds and that these deeds were done under the control of and for the benefit of the prosecutors and carried out through the chain of command. Plaintiff believes that the officers arrested the plaintiff under orders from their superiors and the prosecutors, and that these superiors directly caused through direct orders or implied orders.

Sgt. Greer is named as a defendant in that he acted to cover up and conceal the misdeeds of his fellow officers by producing a knowingly false Internal Affairs report and refusing to act to discipline his fellow officers when he had a duty to act. And similarly, Police Chief Rowe is accused here of covering up and concealing the improper acts of his fellow officers and that of Sgt. Greer.

The City of Springfield is liable in that the plaintiff has alleged that the acts of the officers, that violated the rights of its citizens, were done under policies and customs of the city and the Springfield Police Department. The plaintiff has also raised the issue of City liability for improper training and failure to supervise and control its officers. Gross negligence and deliberate indifference are also causes that make the City liable under 1983. Plaintiff also contends that the City can be held liable for cruel and unusual punishment for failing to maintain its jails.

Plaintiff also contends that it is city policy to allow the victims of police misconduct to be prosecuted by the City of Springfield as a deterrent, using fear and intimidation, to discourage citizens from asserting their rights and suing the city. Plaintiff maintains that he believes that council members were deliberately indifferent towards the plaintiff's prosecution in hope that he would see that there is no avenue for justice in Springfield Missouri and would be discouraged from filing a lawsuit to protect his rights. See Kevin Albright, Petitioner V. Roger Oliver, Etc., Et Al. 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114, 62 U.S.L.W. 4078. Plaintiff contends that this policy and custom is part of an overall custom of the city to violate the civil rights of its citizens through retaliation against those who would "rock the boat".

Another similar persistent and widespread policy of the City is that the Police Internal Affairs Department generally finds most all complaints unfounded, and on that basis the officer complained of files a lawsuit against the citizen citing the "unfounded" status of the complaint. The deliberate indifference of the City and the Internal Affairs department allows the City to not only avoid municipal liability, but save money by retaining substandard police officers. Cities are liable when they have a policy or custom to conceal police misconduct. See John Russell Webster V. City Houston, 735 F.2d 838.

Plaintiff accuses the City Council and the City Manager of deliberate indifference, negligence, and failing to act when they had a duty to act. Plaintiff contends that in spite of his extensive efforts to get the defendant council members and defendant city manager to act, that they refused to do so. Plaintiff contends that had the Council acted they could have at least prevented the malicious prosecution from continuing as long as it did. Plaintiff contends that under these circumstances that these inactions could even rise to the level of participants in the conspiracy.

In general, the allegations are that the arresting officers are liable because they actually violated the plaintiff's civil rights. The other police are liable because they were part of the "team" that made the decision to violate the plaintiff's rights. The prosecutors were also part of that team, or the team served the will of the prosecutors and acted with their knowledge and approval. Chief Rowe and Sgt. Greer attempted to cover it up. The City Manager and the City Council actively ignored the plaintiff's communications. And the City is liable because of its customs and policies.

The law of libel protects against malicious defamation. Slander, in general, is not actionable unless actual damage is proved. To this the courts very early established certain specific exceptions: the imputation of crime [in Missouri, the crime must be punishable by imprisonment, Kirk v. Ebenhoch, 354 Mo. 762, 191 S.W.2d 643], of a loathsome disease, and those affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, office or calling - which required no proof of damage.

In the officer's police report, the plaintiff is accused of criminal activity with prostitutes. Acts that even if true had nothing to do with the trespassing charge. The police printed statements from a woman who never met the plaintiff indicating that she wouldn't have sex with him based on what she heard. The report also accused the plaintiff of having sex without a condom implying that he had a loathsome disease.

The information about the prostitutes had nothing at all to do with the plaintiff's trespassing charge. This information came directly from other evidence this same team had gathered in their prosecution of Mr. Slack. This information in the plaintiff's police report came directly from the case files of defendant's Patterson and Carrier. Plaintiff contends that the fact that the prosecutor's private criminal investigation files of Mr. Slack's case appears in the plaintiff's trespassing police report establishes a direct causal relationship that the prosecutors were directly involved in the plaintiff's trespassing arrest.

Since this information was private and secret, the prosecutors would have to have given the arresting officers access to and permission to use this confidential information; unless, of course the prosecutors are going to take the position that the arresting officers stole the information without the prosecutor's knowledge. Such an admission, however, would call into question the security procedures in place at the time to prevent disclosure of confidential information.

It's clear on the face of the police report, that the inclusion of the sexual information could only have been included for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff. This information had nothing to do with establishing the elements of the crime of trespassing. The arresting officers defamed the plaintiff, but the prosecutor's secret criminal case file was the source of the defamatory material. Plaintiff contends that the fact that this information made it out of the prosecutor's files in the first place established the liability of the prosecutor.

The plaintiff was charged with trespassing and arraigned before municipal court for trespassing. Plaintiff on several occasions contacted the City Council and City Manager and indicated he was falsely being prosecuted for a crime. During this time between the arraignment and the election, none of the defendants took any action to investigate and stop the prosecution of the plaintiff. Just two days before the election the Springfield News Leader included a section profiling all the candidates. In there the plaintiff was profiled as the Democratic candidate for the 7^th District of Missouri. In his profile the paper mentioned that he had been charged with trespassing. Several news agencies accessed the police report that included the accusations from Mr. Slack's case depicting the plaintiff as a sexual pervert.

Did it affect the election? The fact that the newspaper printed it as part of the candidate profile clearly indicated that the reporters at the Springfield News Leader, who could be considered political experts, believed it was very significant. In fact, the plaintiff, in his interview with a reporter from the News Leader, informed them that if he were to be elected, that he would be the only programmer in Congress when the Y2K bug hits. In spite of this, the News Leader chose to print the trespassing information instead. If the plaintiff weren’t a candidate for United States Congress, the Springfield News Leader would not have printed this story in the candidate profiles two days before the election.

In spite of being fully briefed several times, had the Internal Affairs Department of the Springfield Police done their job, or had the Chief of Police done his job, or the City Manager done his job, or the Prosecutor’s done their job, or the City Council or the Mayor done their job, the Plaintiff would never have been arraigned and the newspaper wouldn’t have written about the plaintiff’s trespassing charge just two days before the election. Not only was there deliberate indifference, based on the fact that the plaintiff was a candidate for federal office, malice has to be inferred.

The plaintiff made the prosecutors aware that he had been charged with a crime and that the police were using illegal means to obtain evidence in their behalf. Plaintiff provided the prosecutors with copies of his police report complete with the information taken out of the prosecutor’s own criminal case files, yet, having this knowledge, the prosecutors did absolutely nothing to stop the plaintiff from being wrongfully prosecuted during his election.

Plaintiff theorizes that a factor as to why the prosecutors failed to act was that the prosecutors had actual knowledge of the improper methods that were being used to obtain evidence against Mr. Slack. Had the prosecutors intervened in behalf of the plaintiff, they would have had to reveal to the courts that all the evidence that was to be used to convict Mr. Slack was tainted and would have to be thrown out. Mr. Slack and three of his associates were later convicted with evidence that the plaintiff had shown the prosecutors, was improperly obtained. Plaintiff contends that the prosecutors’ behavior constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.

Thus, in order to advance their own improper purposes, the prosecutors concealed the misdeeds of the arresting officers from the municipal court and from the Greene County Circuit Judges who were trying Mr. Slack and his associates. The plaintiff paid the price with his reputation so that the prosecutors could conceal exculpatory information from the Courts. Information that would have reversed the convictions of six of the prosecutors’ targets. The prosecutor now claims immunity for these acts? Plaintiff doesn’t think so.

It is well settled in the case of Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S., at 689, that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are "persons" within the meaning of Section(s) 1983. The courts have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 818 (1985). Instead, in Monell and subsequent cases, the courts have required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under Section(s) 1983 to identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the plaintiff's injury. See Monell, supra, at 694; Pembaur, supra, at 480-481; Canton, supra, at 389. Locating a "policy" ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Monell, supra, at 694. Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a "custom" that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decision maker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law. 436 U. S., at 690-691 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 167-168 (1970)).

In the case of City Of Canton, Ohio V. Harris Et Al. 489 U.S. 378, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 57 U.S.L.W. 4270, it was held that a city can be held liable based on a failure to train where there is a deliberate indifference to the civil rights of citizens. Cannon states:

In this case, not only were the police not trained to know that they can't arrest people in their homes without a warrant, but that the Chief of Police and the Internal Affairs department don't seem to know it either. And after three letters to City Council explaining in detail the civil rights violations, City Council took no action to fix the problem. Thus the plaintiff's pleading easily meets the requirements to hold the city liable.

The plaintiff recognizes that prosecutors have absolute immunity when he is performing quasi-judicial functions. That is why the plaintiff didn't sue the city prosecutor. The city prosecutor is immune. The county prosecutors, however, are not immune. They didn't violate the rights of the plaintiff while prosecuting him. The prosecutor violated his rights in his investigative capacity. It was held in Zed Daniels, Plaintiff-Appellee, V. Richard L. Kieser, Defendant-Appellant. 586 F.2d 64:

The case of Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York 996 f.2d 522 made a clear distinction as to when a prosecutor is, or is not immune from suit by stating:

This complaint charges numerous counts and has several defendants. No pleading is ever perfect. Rule 8 encourages the plaintiff to keep the pleading short and not to argue the entire case in the pleading. Plaintiff hopes this brief will clear up issues raised in the defendants' motions with regard to what the theory of liabilities are and which defendants are charged with what counts. Plaintiff believes that the pleading along with this brief will sufficiently appraise the defendants of the charges against them.

The section on Sovereign Immunity was intended to make a point about how shocking this situation is and was not intended by the plaintiff to admit that any form of immunity applies to any of these defendants. Plaintiff withdraws these statements.

Defendants claim that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. It is well established in law that a person has the right to sue police for false arrest, illegal search, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other violations of constitutional rights. Defendants seem to be making a vague argument that these officers are above the law. These defendants seem to also be claiming that a person's civil rights are a frivolous claim. Plaintiff contends that Section 1983 was enacted by the legislature specifically to give citizens the right to sue police who violate a citizens constitutional rights. Plaintiff contends that the defendants' affirmative defenses are frivolous.

Defendants Greer, Routh, and Rowe raise the issue of respondeat superior. Plaintiff agrees with the defendants and isn't relying on this theory. Plaintiff is not claiming these defendants are liable based merely on being higher up in the chain of command. Plaintiff also does not allege liability against these defendants for failing to train or supervise. That allegation makes the City liable. Routh and Rowe are accused of being part of the team who actively participated in the decisions to order Hollie and Shipley to commit illegal acts against the plaintiff. Greer and Rowe are accused of conspiring to cover up and to conceal improper conduct. Plaintiff also accuses them of being liable based on deliberate indifference. The section titled "Gross Incompetence / Deliberate Indifference" applies this charge to all the defendants. This is especially true of Rowe and Greer who were deliberately indifferent towards the plaintiff's Internal Affairs complaint.

Paragraph 37 is in error and was not intended to be interpreted that the claim of negligence is the plaintiff's only claim. The rules allow the Plaintiff to amend the pleading in the interest of justice and the words "wholly and solely" really don't apply. Defendants seem to have erroneously interpreted this paragraph to nullify all his other claims against these defendants. Plaintiff compliments their lawyers for their artistic interpretation.

It's clearly established in the case of Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S., at 689 that the City of Springfield is a legal person under Section 1983 and is not immune from suit. The city manager and members of council are also liable under the theory of deliberate indifference and gross negligence and conspiracy to conceal police misconduct through their inaction when they had a duty to act. Their deliberate indifference has caused the plaintiff constitutional harm. See Owen V. City Of Independence, Missouri, Et Al. 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673.

Plaintiff admits that his case against these defendants is dependant on the theory that these prosecutors were directly involved in causing the arrest of the plaintiff to occur. That they either ordered the officers through the chain of command to arrest the plaintiff, or they were aware that the officers were using illegal means to obtain evidence on their behalf. Liability under this theory is similar to a pawn broker selling merchandise he knows is stolen. Even though he didn't steal the merchandise himself, he knew it was stolen and was the beneficiary of the crime. In this case, the prosecutors are the beneficiaries of the crime and in their zeal to pursue Mr. Slack, directly or indirectly caused the plaintiff to be arrested. The plaintiff contends that the reason he was arrested and falsely charged with trespassing was to be questioned about Mr. Slack on behalf of the prosecutors. The plaintiff's arrest is a direct result of the prosecutors investigation a nd that they had actual knowledge of and/or participated in causing these illegal arrests to occur. The fact that half of the police report on the plaintiff's trespassing arrest talks about Mr. Carrier's and Mr. Patterson's criminal case against Mr. Slack is clear evidence of a direct causal connection between these defendants and the violations of the plaintiff's civil rights.

Plaintiff contends that these prosecutors were fully aware that many people associated with Mr. Slack had been illegally arrested and that this method was producing a lot of evidence. The plaintiff was only one out of about ten people whose rights were abused in this manner. If the prosecutors were, in fact, deliberately and knowingly causing criminal activity to occur in the investigative phase, immunity would not apply.

Although prosecutors, like judges, enjoy broad immunity, they are only immune in their role as a prosecutor in a judicial setting. These acts occurred outside of that scope. The prosecutors were investigating a possible crime, not prosecuting the plaintiff. See Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York 996 f.2d 522. The city prosecutor, Penny Melton, who prosecuted the plaintiff for trespassing has immunity and therefore is not a defendant in this action. These prosecutors were not at any time prosecuting the plaintiff.

Nobody actually has "absolute immunity". Even judicial immunity has the limit of "clear absence of all jurisdiction" and the act must be a "judicial act". If a judge ordered the arrest of a random person in their home who he had absolutely no jurisdiction over, that judge would not be immune. Judges can't order that a bunch of people be rounded up for questioning and jailing them on bogus charges if they don't cooperate. Why then should a prosecutor enjoy a greater immunity than a judge?

The reason that injunctive relief is necessary is because of how widespread the problem is. The essential facts are indisputable. The plaintiff was arrested in his home without a warrant. It is clear that officers of the Police Department had to have some training in the use of arrest warrants and that all these defendants must know that you can’t arrest people in their home without a warrant. In spite of that, all these defendants, many of whom actually control the conduct of their subordinated have concealed the seriousness of these offenses in order to allow these abuses to continue. Internal Affairs complaints were declared "unfounded" and the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendants. It is the plaintiff’s belief that to this day these officers are still on duty and have neither been investigated nor reprimanded for their improper conduct. There is a pervasive custom in Springfield Missouri government that they don’t know what the law is, and the y don’t care what the law is. The City Council, through their attorney, claim to this Court that the plaintiff’s right to not be arrested in his home without a warrant is frivolous.

With this kind of system in place, the citizens of Springfield Missouri have effectively been stripped of their constitutional right to be secure in their homes. If the Democratic Candidate for the United States House of Representatives, a man who doesn’t so much as have points on his driver’s license, can be dragged out of his home in the middle of the night and imprisoned, then how can any person be secure in their homes at night? They can’t!

This Court therefore has a duty, not only to the plaintiff, but to all citizens of Springfield Missouri to protect and defend the civil rights of the citizens of this community by making the appropriate orders that will ensure the community is protected from these defendants.

Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the Court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states:

Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgement, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom. Thus if there is any possible theory that would entitle the Plaintiff to relief, even one that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of, the court can not dismiss this case.

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Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 02-01-99

Attached: Copy of the police report slightly altered to protect the names of third parties.