The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Held: The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Pp. 583-603.

(a) The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests, but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home, which is too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is present. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Pp. 583-590.

(b) The reasons for upholding warrantless arrests in a public place, cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, do not apply to warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home. The common-law rule on warrantless home arrests was not as clear as the rule on arrests in public places; the weight of authority as it appeared to the Framers of the Fourth Amendment was to the effect that a warrant was required for a home arrest, or at the minimum that there were substantial risks in proceeding without one. Although a majority of the States that have taken a position on the question permit warrantless home arrest, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, there is an obvious declining trend, and there is by no means the kind of virtual unanimity on this question that was present in United States v. Watson, supra, with regard to warrantless public arrests. And, unlike the situation in Watson, no federal statutes have been cited to indicate any congressional determination that warrantl ess entries into the home are "reasonable." Pp. 590-601.

(c) For Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Pp. 602-603.

It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). *fn10 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the presence of ' exigent circ umstances'"). See also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296-297 (1984) (plurality opinion); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id., at 583, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. *fn11 Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 318, and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the home, see Santana, supra.

Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.

This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed:

"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was present in this case. This method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or security, it is notable that few of the searches found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category o f crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to be suppressed, I do not think its suppression is more important to society than the security of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." Id., at 459-460 (footnote omitted).

Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D.C. 313, 320, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (1970). *fn13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also considered the gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.

For example, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22 (CA2 1978) (allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent-circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded"); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sande rs, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Ore. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.

We therefore conclude that the common-sense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures," and hold that an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, see Payton, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.

During the one- to two-hour period between Sheriff Reynolds' first observation of Morgan at Potter Falls and Morgan's subsequent arrest, no effort was made by any law enforcement agency to obtain a search or arrest warrant. When asked at the suppression hearing why he did not obtain a warrant from one of the judges available on the weekend, Chief Alcorn stated: "Well, generally -- we have tried to, on several occasions, to contact the judges on the weekend and either one of the judges are hard to reach on the weekend."

The district court granted Morgan's motion to suppress the.45 caliber pistol seized by Chief Alcorn which was the only basis for federal charges against Morgan. The district court found no exigent circumstances justifying the police officers' warrantless entry and subsequent search of the Morgan home. In the opinion of the court, "there was sufficient time" to obtain an arrest or search warrant. Because we agree there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry of the home and arrest of Morgan, we affirm the order of the district court.

Absent exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter an individual's home or lodging to effect a warrantless arrest or search. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980). As clearly stated in Payton, 445 U.S. at 590:

In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of the person, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not be reasonably crossed without a warrant. This is not a novel idea. As eloquently explained by Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 92 L. Ed. 436, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948),

Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's home secure only in the discretion of police officers. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.

See also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 n. 10, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 52 U.S.L.W. 4581, 4584 n. 10 (1984) (fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense). This principle has been consistently applied in this circuit. United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 452 U.S. 918, 69 L. Ed. 2d 423, 101 S. Ct. 3056 (1981); United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 569, 574 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902, 101 S. Ct. 274, 66 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1980); United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 1977). Moreover, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigency. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 90 S. Ct. 1969 (1970); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 93 L. Ed. 153, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948); United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d at 733. Also, a district court's factual finding on the existence of exigent circumstances will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Gargotto, 510 F.2d 409, 411 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 987, 44 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct. 1990, reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884, 96 S. Ct. 157, 46 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1975); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836, 58 L. Ed. 2d 132, 99 S. Ct. 119 (1978); see also United States v. Collis, 699 F.2d 832, 835 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119, 103 S. Ct. 3088, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1349 (1983) (district court's finding on whether an illegal seizure has occurred subject to clearly erroneous test). In United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1355, the court explained that the "term 'exigent circumstances,' in conjunction with an arrest in a residence, refers to a situation where the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action." See also United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1980). M oreover, the critical time for determining whether exigency exists "is the moment of the warrantless entry by the officers" onto the premises of the defendant. United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d at 733.

The record here reveals no exigency sufficient to justify the warrantless entry of the home and arrest of Morgan. None of the traditional exceptions justifying abandonment of the warrant procedure are present here. The officers involved were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934, 63 L. Ed. 2d 770, 100 S. Ct. 1328 (1980) (warrantless entry upheld where officers first began surveillance having good cause to believe that they would need to wait only a few minutes before defendant exited from private residence). Chief Alcorn specifically testified that he and his officers had sufficient time to assemble at a local coffee shop where they "assessed the situation" and waited for Sheriff Reynolds' arrival before proceeding to the Morgan home. This fact directly contradicts the claim of the United States that the police officers involved here were in hot pursuit of Morgan from the time they first confronted him in Potters Falls until the time his Cadillac was spotted next to his mother's home. The "hot pursuit" exception to a warrant requirement may not be invoked merely because police officers find it inconvenient to obtain a warrant before proceeding with an arrest. On the contrary, the "hot pursuit" exception is reserved for situations where speed is essential to protect a compelling governmental interest. Hayden v. Warden, supra, 387 U.S. at 298-99; United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280, 1285 (6th Cir. 1984). Here, the facts indicate that the officers did not feel an "urgent need for immediate action." United States v. Flickinger, supra, 573 F.2d at 1355. "Where, as here, officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a search [or arrest] warrant." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454, 93 L. Ed. 153, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948).

Nor was this a situation where a suspect represented an immediate threat to the arresting officers or the public which justified the absence of a warrant. The United States argues no warrant was required because the police conduct constituted a "cursory safety check," which is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1983) (and cases cited therein). We disagree. To satisfy the cursory safety check exception "the government must show that there was 'a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger.'" United States v. Kolodzeij, supra, 706 F.2d at 596, quoting United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S. Ct. 1119, 47 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1976). The record in this case reveals no such immediate threat or security risk to the officers involved here. As found by the district court, the evidence "shows that the occupants of the house we re peaceful until startled by Officer Alcorn's car coming up their driveway in a clandestine manner." Moreover, Morgan's prior contact with police officials had been friendly and cooperative. There was no substantiated evidence that Morgan was dangerous or that a grave offense or crime of violence had occurred or was even threatened. United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d at 734. Other than the unconfirmed information supplied to Sheriff Reynolds by an unidentified person, the police officers could point to no other substantiated evidence that indicated Morgan or his companions posed an impending threat to the police or to the public. Indeed, all the proven evidence indicates Morgan and his friends posed no risk to anyone until the police officers surrounded the Morgan home and flooded it with high-powered spotlights. See United States v. Hatcher, 680 F.2d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1982) (government failed to show evidence indicating that defendant was a dangerous individual to justi fy warrantless "protective sweep" of defendant's home). We believe that looking at the totality of the circumstances, the district court was correct in concluding that the facts did not indicate any risk to justify a warrantless entry into the Morgan home. See United States v. Killebrew, supra, (where there were no facts indicating occupant was dangerous or about to escape, warrantless entry into suspect's motel room violated fourth amendment, even though police knew occupant possessed a gun); see also United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274, 1277 (7th Cir. 1973). To justify this type of warrantless intrusion, police officers "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with other rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Police officials, however, are not free to create exigent circumstances to justify their warrant less intrusions. United States v. Allard I, 600 F.2d 1301, 1304 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) ("If exigent circumstances were created, they resulted from the agent's own conduct.")

Finally, there can be no claim that immediate police action was needed to prevent the destruction of vital evidence or thwart the escape of known criminals. See Warden v. Hayden, supra; United States v. Butler, 533 F.2d 221, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 865, 54 L. Ed. 2d 141, 98 S. Ct. 200 (1977). Morgan and his friends were peacefully occupying a private home in the evening until they were alarmed by the surreptitious police approach and the bright lights. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Morgan or his friends were engaged in the destruction of evidence or about to remove contraband to another jurisdiction.

In sum, there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless intrusion by the police onto the Morgan property. As Chief Alcorn testified, Morgan's arrest was a planned occurrence, rather than the result of an ongoing field investigation. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4585, (hot pursuit exception to warrant requirement rejected "because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the from the scene of the crime"); 2 W. La. Fave, Search and Seizure § 6.1(c) pp. 386-392. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 n.27, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971). Therefore, a warrant should have been obtained before proceeding to the Morgan home. Arguably, Morgan's activities in the park may have provided probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. This, however, can not excuse the failure to secure a warrant. Police officers may not, in their zeal to arrest an individual, ignore the fourth amendment's warrant requirement merely because it is inconvenient. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15, 92 L. Ed. 436, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948). Absent exigent circumstances, the privacy of a home may not be invaded without a warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 590.

As an alternative justification for its actions, the United States argues that the facts here, "at the very least," provided the reasonable suspicion of a weapons violation necessary to support a brief investigatory stop of Morgan and his group. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The government then contends that once Morgan appeared at the door holding a weapon in plain view, the police were justified in immediately arresting him and seizing the weapon. Even assuming the validity of this legal theory, *fn1 the police conduct outside of the Morgan home cannot be characterized as a brief investigatory stop. On the contrary, the record provides ample proof that, "as a practical matter, was under arrest," Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1327, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 240 (1983) (plurality opinion), as soon as the police surrounded the Morgan home, and therefore, the arrest violated Payton because no warrant had been secured. The police show of force and authority was such that a "reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980), (opinion of Stewart, J.); United States v. Robinson, 650 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1981). To describe the encounter between the police and Morgan as a "brief investigatory stop" ignores the facts of this case. Nine police officers and several patrol cars approached and surrounded the Morgan residence in the dark. The officer in charge strategically positioned his car in the driveway in front of the Morgan home blocking any movement of his car. The police then called for Morgan to come out of the house. "These circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.'" Florida v. Royer, U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 1326-1327 (plurality opinion), id. at 1330 (Brennan, J., concurring in result), i d. at 1332-1333 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.). Viewed objectively, Morgan was placed under arrest, without the issuance of a warrant, at the moment the police encircled the Morgan residence.

The government's reliance on Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982), is misplaced. In Chrisman, the Court held it reasonable for a police officer to monitor the movements of a person lawfully arrested, even if it resulted in a warrantless entry into a residence. Id. at 817. However, the reasoning of Chrisman does not apply here for two reasons. First, the initial detention in Chrisman was a lawful arrest; here Morgan's arrest was unlawful because there was no warrant for his arrest. Secondly, in Chrisman the person initially arrested invited the police officer to accompany him to his dormitory room. This in turn led to the observation of contraband in the dorm room and resulted in the prosecution of his roommate, Chrisman. Here, Morgan did not invite anyone anywhere. As far as this record indicates, he knew nothing of the investigation undertaken by Chief Alcorn.

Nor do the Court's recent holdings in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984), affect the result in this case. Leon held that the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule should not be utilized to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a magistrate which was later determined to be invalid. Segura v. United States concerned whether, "because of an earlier illegal entry, the fourth amendment requires suppression of evidence seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on information obtained by the police before the entry into the residence." Id. at 797-98. The Segura Court decided that the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant should not have been suppressed because the "warrant and information on which it was based were unrelated to the (earlie r illegal) entry and therefore constituted an independent source for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920)." Segura, 468 U.S. at 799. Here, it is undisputed that the officers did not have a search or arrest warrant, nor were they in the process of obtaining such a warrant.

The government, however, maintains that with or without exigent circumstances, no warrant was needed to call Morgan out of his home. The cases cited by the government in support of this claim, United States v. Renfro, supra, 620 F.2d at 574-75, McGeehan v. Wainwright, 526 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997, 96 S. Ct. 2214, 48 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1976), United States v. Herring, 582 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d at 1031-32, do not support this argument. Renfro involved police officers forcibly entering the home of suspects wanted for serious felonies. The forcible entry in Renfro was necessitated by the suspects' apparent destruction of evidence. No such destruction of evidence was present here. Herring involved the peaceful arrest of a suspect outside of his motel as he responded to the knocks of the arresting officers. The arrest here was hardly peaceful. Moreover, to the extent that the Herring court validates the warrantless arrest of an individual standing in the doorway of a private residence absent exigent circumstances, we believe the rule of Payton v. New York, would compel a contrary result had Herring been decided subsequent to the Payton decision. McGeehan, decided prior to Payton, involved the unplanned, warrantless arrest of robbery suspects located inside a trailer home shortly after the police had received information identifying the suspects and their escape car. Here, the arrest of Morgan was a planned event; it was not the result of an ongoing field investigation. Smith also decided prior to Payton, involved the arrest of a suspect, based on a valid warrant, who was discovered by police inside his mobile home. None of these cases support the assertion that police officers may arouse and seize a citizen, peacefully residing in the privacy of his home, without exigent circumstances to support the intrusion. In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that police may arbit rarily invade an individual's expectation of privacy. The Court has declared that "at the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961). To protect this important right, the framers of the amendment required that judicial approval be obtained before police be allowed to intrude into the privacy of the home, absent exigent circumstances. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56, 93 L. Ed. 153, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 13-14. Therefore, arbitrary governmental intrusions into the sanctity of the home are the prime evils the fourth amendment was designed to deter.

The government further argues that the rule of Payton is inapplicable here because the officers in question did not cross the threshold until Morgan was arrested after appearing at the door with gun in hand. We disagree. In Payton v. New York, police officers, with probable cause to arrest, knocked on the door of Obie Riddick's apartment. After Riddick's three-year-old son opened the door, the police could see Riddick sitting in bed. The police then entered the residence and arrested Riddick. Payton, 445 U.S. at 578. In finding this arrest invalid, the Supreme Court held that, absent exigent circumstances, warrantless intrusions into a suspect's home are unconstitutional. Similarly, in United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982), FBI agents, using fictitious names, knocked on the door of Raymond Johnson with their guns drawn. When Johnson opened the door, the agents identified themselves and asked to talk to Johnson. Johnson invited them in. After the agents were inside, they arrested Johnson. The Ninth Circuit, relying on the rule of Payton, held "the arrest of Johnson, while he stood within the door of his home," violated the fourth amendment because no warrant had been obtained and no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless intrusion. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757 (emphasis added). The court specifically noted that

In this case, we are confronted with the situation where the suspect was arrested as he stood inside his home with drawn weapons. In these circumstances, it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home. Otherwise, arresting officers could avoid illegal "entry" into a home simply by remaining outside the doorway and controlling the movements of suspects within through the use of weapons that greatly extend the "reach" of the arresting officers.

United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757. *fn2 We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the important consideration in this type of case "is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agent, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home."

Applying this rule here, it is undisputed that Morgan was peacefully residing in his mother's home until he was aroused by the police activities occurring outside. Morgan was then compelled to leave the house. Thus, as in Johnson, supra, "it cannot be said that voluntarily exposed himself to a warrantless arrest" by appearing at the door. On the contrary, Morgan appeared at the door only because of the coercive police behavior taking place outside of the house. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 13 (police entry to defendant's living quarters "granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right"). Viewed in these terms, the arrest of Morgan occurred while he was present inside a private home. Although there was no direct police entry into the Morgan home prior to Morgan's arrest, the constructive entry accomplished the same thing, namely, the arrest of Morgan. Thus, the warrantless arrest o f Morgan, as he stood within the door of a private home, after emerging in response to coercive police conduct, violated Morgan's fourth amendment rights. A contrary rule would undermine the constitutional precepts emphasized in Payton. See United States v. McCool, 526 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) ("to uphold warrantless arrests at a person's home whenever law enforcement officers successfully obtain his presence at a door too readily allows subversion of the Payton principle"). And because Morgan's arrest was unlawful, any evidence seized incident to that arrest was obtained illegally and therefore must be suppressed. Payton v. New York, supra; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 89 S. Ct. 1394 (1969); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5, 76 L. Ed. 951, 52 S. Ct. 466 (1932).

Finally, the warrantless seizure of Morgan's gun cannot be supported by the "plain view" doctrine. The "plain view" doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of private possessions where three requirements are satisfied:

First, the police officer must lawfully make an "initial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the location of evidence and intend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. Finally, it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, , 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1540, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983) (citations omitted) (plurality opinion); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-70, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971) (plurality opinion). Here the facts fail to satisfy the first prong of the "plain view" doctrine because the police officers in this case did not "lawfully make an 'initial intrusion' or [were not] otherwise . . . properly in a position" from which an item of contraband could be viewed. The appearance of the police and the arrest of Morgan was not the result of any exigency authorizing the police presence. Thus, the police were not "lawfully engaged" in legitimate police activities at the moment the object in question came into "plain view." Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1541. "The primary requisite for . . . application of the plain view doctrine is that the police officer has a right to be where he is when he sees the evidence." United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 248 ( 9th Cir. 1978). Moreover, even assuming that the police officers were rightfully in a position to view the gun, the "plain view" doctrine does not authorize warrantless entries into a private home merely because an item of contraband has become visible to those outside. As stated by Justice Stewart in Coolidge, supra :

Plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 76 L. Ed. 951, 52 S. Ct. 466; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 92 L. Ed. 436, 68 S. Ct. 367; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 93 L. Ed. 153, 69 S. Ct. 191; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-498, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514, 1518, 78 S. Ct. 1253; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828, 81 S. Ct. 776; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 92 L. Ed. 1663, 68 S. Ct. 1229.

Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 486 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Here, the conduct of the police went beyond permissible bounds. Because the initial intrusion by the police was illegal, any evidence or contraband discovered as a result of that intrusion was illegally obtained. United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1123 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298, 303 n.6 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Assuming a valid basis for arrest, an illegal method of execution, for instance an unlawful forcible entry, can result in the exclusion of any evidence obtained as a result of the officer's illegal conduct.").

As recently confirmed by the Court, the privacy of the home "deserve the most scrupulous protection from governmental invasion." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 52 U.S.L.W. 4425, 4427 (1984); See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, , 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 52 U.S.L.W. 5102, 5104 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra. The warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is not a ritual which can be ignored because it may be inconvenient.

We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . . The Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 93 L. Ed. 153, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948). The Supreme Court has repeatedly "underscored the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy." Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514, 78 S. Ct. 1253 (1958). And the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972). The police officers here violated this constitutional principle. Accordingly, we find that Morgan was illegally arrested when the police surrounded the Morgan home and utilized coercive tactics and physical restraints which induced his presence at the door. And because this conduct was not justified by a valid warrant or exigent circumstances, the subsequent police seizure of the gun placed inside of the door by Morga n was illegally obtained, and therefore, properly suppressed.