Jurisdiction of this action is based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1331, 1331(a) and the Due Process Clause of Art. IV of the United States Constitution. This court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's common law claims, infra, and venue is proper pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391. The issue before this court is the violation of the Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and raises federal questions and constitutional issues.

• Marc Perkel - Plaintiff in the underlying fraud case. Perkel complains that the Defendants violated his rights civil under the 4^th, 5^th, 6^th, 8^th and 14^th amendments of the United States Constitution by False Arrest, Illegal Search, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution. (Hereafter Plaintiff)

• The City of Springfield Missouri - A Municipality duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri. (Hereafter The City)
• Kevin A. Hollie, - Officer of the Springfield Police Department who arrested the Plaintiff in his home without a warrant. (Hereafter Officer Hollie)
• Kent Shipley, - Second officer of the Springfield Police Department who arrested the Plaintiff in his home without a warrant. (Hereafter Officer Shipley)
• Kevin Routh, - Officer Hollie's and Officer Shipley's superior who was the officer in charge of investigating Mr. Slack and his associates. (Hereafter Sgt. Routh)
• Robert Greer, - Head of the Internal Affairs Department for the City of Springfield Police Department. (Hereafter Sgt. Greer)
• Lynn Rowe, - Chief of Police for the City of Springfield Police Department.
• Dan Patterson, - Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Greene County.
• Ronald Carrier, - Former Greene County Prosecutor.
• Thomas Finney, - City Manager of Springfield Missouri.
• Leland Gannaway, - Mayor of Springfield Missouri.
• Bob Vanaman, - Zone 1 Council.
• Shelia O. Wright, - Zone 2 Council.
• Conrad Griggs, - Zone 3 Council.
• Russell Rhodes, - Zone 4 Council.
• Thomas J. Carlson, - General Council A.
• Gary Gibson, - General Council B.
• Teri Hacker, - General Council C.
• Bob Chancellor, - General Council D.

1. Upon information and belief, that at all times hereafter mentioned, the defendant the City of Springfield was and still is a municipality duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri.
2. Upon information and belief, that at all times hereafter mentioned, the City, its agents, servants, and employees, maintained and controlled the Springfield Police Department including the Chief of Police, Internal Affairs Department, all police officers thereof.
3. Upon information and belief, that at all times hereafter mentioned, the Springfield Police Department employed Officers Hollie and Shipley as police officers, Sgt. Robert Greer as the chief Internal Affairs Officer, Lynn Rowe as the Chief of Police, and Tom Finnie as City Manager.
4. Upon information and belief, that at all times hereafter mentioned, that Leland Gannaway is the Mayor of Springfield and a member of City Council, and that Bob Vanaman, Shelia O. Wright, Conrad Griggs, Russell Rhodes, Thomas J. Carlson, Gary Gibson, Teri Hacker, and Bob Chancellor are all members of City Council.
5. Upon information and belief, that at all times hereafter mentioned, the Greene County Prosecutors office employed Ronald Carrier as Greene County Prosecutor and Dan Patterson and an Assistant Greene County Prosecutor.
6. Upon information and belief, that at all times hereafter mentioned, that officers Hollie and Shipley were working on the case of Mr. Slack and his associates, and that they were under the command of Sgt. Routh, who was investigating on behalf of and under the authority and control of Prosecutors Dan Patterson and Ronald Carrier, and that Sgt. Routh was under the command of Chief of Police Lynn Rowe, who was under the authority of City Manager Thomas Finney, who was under the authority of the City Council.
7. This action arises under the United States Constitution, particularly under provisions of the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, and under Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983 and the rights under the Constitution and the laws of the State of Missouri.
8. That each and all of the acts of the defendants alleged herein were done by the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, and each of them, not as individuals, but under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of the State of Missouri, County of Greene, and City of Springfield, and under the authority of their employment with full knowledge and approval of their superiors, as agents of the city, county, and state.
9. In all cases, the defendants are being sued both individually and in their official capacities.
10. All facts stated herein in any one section are incorporated, reiterated, and realleged in every other section.

False Arrest / Illegal Search / False Imprisonment

11. That on September 8th 1998 at or about 10:30pm at the Plaintiff's home at 1452 North Clay St., the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees wrongfully, falsely, and maliciously arrested the plaintiff in his home without a warrant, and without any right or grounds therefore.
12. That on September 8th 1998 at or about 10:30pm at the Plaintiff's home at 1452 North Clay St., the defendants wrongfully, falsely, and maliciously accused the plaintiff of the crime of trespassing for an alleged trespass that supposedly occurred three days earlier; and that the trespassing charge was initiated by the officers and not by a complainant.
13. That the defendants at the time of the arrest refused to inform the plaintiff of the nature of the charges against him, as required by the sixth amendment, other than that he was being arrested for trespassing. Defendants refused to state when and where he trespassed and who was accusing him of trespassing.
14. That the said arrest and imprisonment was caused by the defendants, their agents, servants and employees, without any warrant or other legal process and without authority of the law and without any reasonable cause or belief that the plaintiff, Marc Perkel, was in fact guilty of a crime, and without exigent circumstances, and without any other legal justification.
15. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, wrongfully and unlawfully, and against the stated wishes of the plaintiff, searched the home of the plaintiff. They then arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff, laying hold of him and with full force of arms, compelled him to go with the police officers to the city jail where he was further searched and placed in the drunk tank for 10 hours without being given the opportunity to make a phone call or post bail, even though the plaintiff had sufficient bail in cash on his person at the time of the imprisonment.
16. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees were acting within the scope of their authority and within the scope of their employment and acted within the rules and customs, whether written or unwritten, of the Springfield Police Department and falsely arrested the plaintiff under color of state law.
17. That upon information and belief, that the false arrest, illegal search, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution were made with the full knowledge and approval of the Greene County Prosecutor.
18. That the plaintiff was wholly innocent of said criminal charges and did not contribute in any way to the conduct of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees and was forced by the defendants, to submit to the aforesaid arrest, search, and imprisonment thereto entirely against his will.
19. That as a result of the aforesaid accusations made by the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees acting under their employment and within the scope of their authority, made falsely, publicly, wickedly, and maliciously, the plaintiff was compelled to appear before a judge in Municipal Court of the City of Springfield where he was arraigned and charged with a crime.
20. That after the arrest, Officer Hollie, acting under the authority of the Springfield Police Department as an agent and employee of the City of Springfield, produced a false police report falsely accusing the plaintiff of acts that Officer Hollie knew he didn't commit and included in his report false and hearsay statements accusing the plaintiff of a number of sex acts with prostitutes, solely for the purpose to defame, embarrass and humiliate the plaintiff and to hurt the plaintiff's reputation, standing in the community, and the plaintiff's chances of winning his election to the United States Congress.
21. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees intended to confine the plaintiff, depriving him of his liberty, and that the plaintiff was conscious of his confinement, and that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged.
22. That by reason of the false arrest, imprisonment, and detention of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was subjected publicly to great indignities, in being detained, charged, and prosecuted with a crime, and greatly injured in his standing in the community, destroying his chances of being elected to the United States Congress, causing him to suffer public shame and ridicule and pain in both mind and body and damage to his reputation.

Gross Incompetence / Deliberate Indifference

23. That it is clearly established in common law that police can not enter a house to make a warrantless arrest unless there is both probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that warrantless arrests in the home are not justified for minor offenses.
24. That it is clearly established in common law that the police have no right to enter a home without a warrant and to conduct a search thereof without a warrant.
25. That it is clearly established in common law that the police can not, on their own authority, decide to imprison a citizen for choosing to remain silent.
26. That it is clearly established in common law that the police can not deny a citizen the right to call and attorney and to make bond.
27. That it is clearly established in common law and police procedures that an officer is required to read the arrestee his Maranda rights before questioning.
28. That it is clearly established in common law that the police can not include in their police reports libelous, slanderous, and defamatory material that they know is not true, and that even if true is unrelated to the charges.
29. That it is clearly established in common law that the Greene County Prosecutors can not conspire with the Springfield Police Department to obtain evidence and testimony that they know was obtained illegally, and that the Prosecutors would have a duty to expose such activity and to disclose it to the proper judges and defense counsels and convicted individuals who’s cases would be affected by said information.
30. That it is clearly established in common law that the Internal Affairs Department, the Chief of Police, the City Manager, and the City Council have a duty to train, discipline, and supervise these officers to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens.
31. That the key facts constituting these civil rights violations are not just the opinion of the plaintiff, but these facts are contained in the Police Reports, and that copies of these Police Reports were delivered to each and every member of City Council, three of whom are lawyers, and the City Manager along with the text of Supreme Court decisions, and in spite of all this information the defendants have shown nothing but deliberate indifference towards the plaintiff.
32. That for all these defendants, their agents, servant, and employees to allow these acts to occur, having been fully and credibly informed of the facts, and to acts as if they didn’t know better, represents a level of incompetence and/or gross indifference to the constitutional rights of the citizens of the City of Springfield that it shocks the conscious.

Negligence in Training, Supervising, and Discipline

33. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees negligently, carelessly, and recklessly failed to properly train and supervise their employees, in particular, the named officer defendants. They failed to train these officers in proper arrest procedures, searches, when to obtain warrants, allowing the arrested to make bail, have phone calls, interrogation of witnesses, imprisonment, constitutional rights, libel, defamation, slander, as well as issues of honesty, courtesy, integrity, civil rights, law, and standard proper police procedures.
34. That the Chief of Police and the head of the Internal Affairs Department, who the City employs, appear to have been so poorly trained that they don’t know that it’s a violation of the constitution to arrest a citizen in their home without a warrant, then search the home, and to imprison said citizen in the Intoxication Tank for refusing to answer questions about the investigation of Mr. Slack.
35. Upon information and belief, the officers were trained by the City, their agents, servants, and employees in methods of violating the civil rights of citizens with impunity by concealing, and obscuring police misconduct; and that this improper training is a police policy or unofficial custom within the Springfield Police Department and the City of Springfield.
36. That the City Council, the City Manager, the Chief of Police, and the Internal Affairs Department were made aware of these problems by the defendant and other citizens on a number of occasions, being presented with strong, detailed, and credible evidence of same, failed to act when they had a duty to act, to prevent further injury to the plaintiff by the defendants as well as a duty to protect the rights, immunities and privileges of the citizens of Springfield. That these individuals of authority knowingly, willingly, and unlawfully allowed, and continues to allow, these unconstitutional practices, procedures and governmental customs to occur, and through their inaction, are willing participants in concealing police misconduct for the purpose of improperly avoiding personal and municipal liability.
37. That the aforesaid arrest, search, imprisonment, and prosecution and the resulting injuries were caused wholly and solely by reason of negligence of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees without any negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

Malicious Prosecution

38. That on September 8^th 1998 at or about 10:30pm in his home the plaintiff was, without a warrant, knowingly unlawfully arrested, searched, imprisoned, and charged with a crime by the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, without any just right or grounds therefore.
39. That the plaintiff was and is wholly innocent and was forced by the defendant to submit to court proceedings.
40. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, falsely and maliciously, and without probable cause commenced a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff and continued said proceeding charging him with the crime of trespassing under City Code 26.152.
41. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees acting within the scope of their authority in the performance of their duties, testified falsely through their police reports and withheld vital information before the judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Springfield.
42. That the said prosecution and criminal charges and hearings were instituted, procured, and continued by the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, and without reasonable or probable cause therefore were continued by the city prosecutor and the police without any reasonable or probable cause and with actual malice, and was terminated in favor of the plaintiff.

The Cover-up – Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice

43. On September 11^th 1998 plaintiff Marc Perkel filed an internal affairs complaint with the Springfield Police Department complaining about the arrest, search, and imprisonment at the hands of the police officers. In Sgt. Greer's response of September 15^th 1998 he determined the complaint to be "unfounded" and indicated that "the actions of the officers were in full compliance with current department policy and/or state law." The plaintiff then sent Sgt. Greer a letter indicating that the arresting officers broke the law based on their own police reports of what they claim happened. Sgt. Greer obstructed justice responding by certified mail on September 24^th 1998 refusing to conduct any further investigation into the complaint.
44. On September 28^th 1998 the plaintiff filed an internal affairs complaint against Sgt. Greer accusing him of misconduct in knowingly covering up the misconduct of the arresting officers. The Police Department has decided not to process said complaint according to an email message sent to the plaintiff by Chief Rowe.
45. On October 1^st 1998 Chief of Police Lynn S. Rowe sent a letter to the plaintiff indicating that he personally has reviewed the investigation conducted by the internal affairs unit. Chief Rowe conspired with Sgt. Greer to obstruct justice in that he stated, "It appears that the officers had lawful authority to take the action that is described in the various reports…" These reports included the police officer’s own arrest report which states that he arrested the plaintiff in his home without a warrant.
46. On at least three separate occasions a copy of these various complaints were hand delivered to members of the Springfield City Council and City Manager Tom Finney. The letters gave detailed information indicating clearly and plainly that the plaintiff's rights had been violated and that there were serious problems with the conduct of the Springfield Police Department and that they were violating the rights of several people including the plaintiff.
47. The communications to City Council included police reports, evidence, Supreme Court decisions, and each time the plaintiff urged City Council to take action to correct the police misconduct and cover-ups by the Internal Affairs Department and the Chief of Police. Plaintiff even noted liability against the City and cited case law indicating that the City can be held liable if they fail to act when they have a duty to act.
48. Based on information and belief, the City Council and the City Manager have obstructed justice by deliberately and knowingly ignoring the communications of the plaintiff and have taken no steps to correct the cover-ups. That the Council, having at least three members who are lawyers and instructed in the law, have chosen, through their inaction to support the cover-up and concealment of the improper police conduct out of negligence and deliberate indifference, and in order to further the cause of improperly avoiding municipal liability.
49. That as a result of the inaction of defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, and after repeated warnings by the plaintiff, the violation of constitutional rights, immunities, and privileges of the citizens of Springfield Missouri by the City of Springfield through conspiracies to obstruct justice has become a government custom. This custom is supported not only by the police officers, but also by their supervisors, the Internal Affairs Department, the Chief of Police, the Greene County Prosecutors, the City Manager, the City Prosecutor, and by each and every member of City Council.

Involvement of Greene County Prosecutor

50. Upon information and belief, that at all times, Prosecutor J. Ronald Carrier and Dan Patterson were assigned the case of prosecuting Michael Slack, case number 98-18038, and several of his associates for prostitution and promotion of prostitution.
51. Upon information and belief, that at all times, Officers Hollie and Shipley and Sgt. Routh were part of a team of police officers who were investigating these prostitution cases in order to obtain evidence on behalf of the Greene County Prosecutor's Office.
52. Upon information and belief, and at all times, that the officers were acting as agents for and under the direction of, either directly or through their superiors, the Prosecutor, and that the Prosecutor knew of and approved of and fully or in part controlled the activities of the officers who acted as servants to their superiors and to the Prosecutor.
53. Upon information and belief, that these officers, under Sgt. Routh, have improperly and illegally harassed, arrested, threatened, assaulted, battered, robbed, tortured, and imprisoned approximately ten individuals who were suspected of being associated with Mr. Slack for the purpose of procuring evidence and testimony, whether true or false, against Mr. Slack, in order to assist the Prosecutors to make their case.
54. Upon information and belief, that the methods of coercing favorable evidence and testimony, whether true or false, included, but not limited to, false arrest, false imprisonment, arrests without warrants, threats including taking away their children, arresting family members, revoking probation and parole, destroying property, sabotaging vehicles, illegal searches and seizures, threatening friends and associates, late night visits, shining lights in windows late at night, armed robbery, stealing money, annoying pets, anonymous threatening phone calls, and unnecessary breaking of doors.
55. Upon information and belief that the Prosecutors, at all times during the investigation of Mr. Slack and his associates, knew of the unlawful conduct of the Springfield Police Officers and in spite of such knowledge not only failed to stop it but actually encouraged it for the purpose of building their case by whatever means necessary, whether legal or not.
56. Upon information and belief, at all times mentioned, that these activities were executed with the full knowledge and approval of the Springfield Police Department including but not limited to Sgt. Routh, the Internal Affairs Department, and the Chief of Police. And that they acted within the customs of the police department and in their official capacities, under color and authority of state law, and within the scope of their employment as police officers.
57. Upon information and belief, that the police officers became aware of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had arranged to post bail for Mr. Slack and that the plaintiff appeared with Mr. Slack in court, and that the plaintiff was assisting Mr. Slack's legal counsel in doing legal research and to prepare a defense, and that the police believed that the plaintiff had information which they could use against Mr. Slack and his associates.
58. Upon information and belief, that because of his association with Mr. Slack that the plaintiff was therefore targeted by the police and the prosecutors, to be arrested, searched, and imprisoned, for the purpose of using terror, fear, intimidation, and imprisonment for the purpose of obtaining information, whether true or false, to achieve the goal of convicting Mr. Slack and his associates.
59. Upon information and belief, that the plaintiff was not, in fact, arrested on a trespassing charge, that he was, in fact, arrested for being an associate of Mr. Slack, and that the officers fabricated the false charge and falsely arrested the plaintiff and imprisoned him for the purpose of coercing information from the plaintiff that the prosecutors could use against Mr. Slack.
60. That in Officer Hollie's police report he states that the plaintiff was placed in the intoxication tank for refusing to answer questions and the police report, which was supposedly a report on a trespassing charge, has little to do with the plaintiff and is mostly concerned with allegations of patronizing prostitution and Mr. Slack's case.

Libel and Defamation of Character

61. Officer Hollie produced a police report pursuant to the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff for the charge of trespassing. In his report Officer Hollie included a detailed report alleging the plaintiff's involvement with Mr. Slack. Included in his report Officer Hollie made many statements about the plaintiff accusing him of hundreds of acts of patronizing prostitutes, obsessed behavior, stalking, photographing sex acts, women describing the plaintiff as "sick", and the opinion of a prostitute who never met the plaintiff describing why she wouldn't want to have sex with the plaintiff based on things she had heard.
62. That many of the statements about the plaintiff were false and that Officer Hollie had actual knowledge that the statements were false, and that Officer Hollie had in fact fabricated the false statements. And that knowing that these statements were false, that he intentionally, knowingly, willfully, and maliciously included the false statements in his police report on the trespassing charge to publicly embarrass the plaintiff and to destroy his good name and reputation, and to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule and hatred.
63. The statements are libelous per se in that the statement accuses the plaintiff of several criminal offenses relating to prostitution that have nothing to do with the trespassing charge. That the defamatory statements accuse the plaintiff of a crime not charged and is apparent on its face and that the police report is not privileged.
64. That in writing the police report that Officer was acting in his capacity as a police officer and that he was acting under color of state law, as an agent, servant, and employee of the city of Springfield, and within his duties as a police officer.
65. That the act of including libel and slander in police reports is an unwritten government custom of the Springfield Police Department and that the libel was a result of poor training, hiring practices, and the lack of disciplinary procedures resulting from gross negligence on the part of the City.
66. That at the time Officer Hollie produced the defamatory police report that the plaintiff was the Democratic candidate running in the general election for the United States House of Representatives.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

67. That on September 8^th 1998, on or about 10:30pm the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees arrested the plaintiff in his home, without a warrant, and without any right or grounds therefore, and searched plaintiff home, and under color of state law, using full force of arms, compelled the plaintiff to the city jail where he was imprisoned in the intoxication tank without being allowed to make bail.
68. That the plaintiff was subsequently charged with a crime based on false statements and false claims in the Police Report made by Officer Hollie, and that Officer Hollie knew of the false nature of his statements, and that the police report was made in his capacity as a police officer, and under the supervision of his superiors.
69. That in the Police Report, Officer Hollie accuses the plaintiff of hundreds of acts of patronizing prostitutes, obsessed behavior, stalking, photographing sex acts, women describing the plaintiff as "sick", and the opinion of a prostitute who never met the plaintiff describing why she wouldn't want to have sex with the plaintiff based on things she had heard; and that many of these claims are knowingly false, and they are unrelated to the charge of trespassing.
70. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff for the purpose of torturing the plaintiff in obtaining information and testimony to be used against Mr. Slack, and to cause fear and intimidation so as to discourage the plaintiff from initiating disciplinary actions against the defendants, and to avoid civil liability.
71. That the conduct was extreme, outrageous, intentional, reckless, with actual malice, and so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
72. That the defendants conduct was a direct result of a governmental custom of concealing offenses, and of unwritten police policy, negligent training and supervision, and that it was done with the full knowledge and approval of the Prosecutors and the Chief of Police.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

73. That on September 8^th 1998 at or about 11:00pm the plaintiff, having been illegally arrested and denied bail or a phone call, and with jail cells available, was placed in the Intoxication Tank at the Springfield City Jail, even though the plaintiff was not intoxicated, nor has he been accused of being intoxicated.
74. That the Intoxication Tank was poorly maintained in that it had a single toilet that was full of feces and urine and was flushed only once in the ten hours during the time the plaintiff was incarcerated. That the floors were filthy and the walls were filthy and blood stained, and that there were no beds or bedding supplies, and that the room was cold, and that sick and cold inmates were denied adequate clothing to keep warm, and there was inadequate seating, and that most inmate had to sit and sleep on the filthy floor, and that the air reeked of smell from decomposing feces and urine and had a high ammonia content so as to cause eye and respiratory irritation, and that there was a high risk of the development and spread of infectious respiratory diseases, and other inmate health risks, and that the food served was a greasy microwave breakfast sandwich and a room temperature glass of Tang or similar artificial fruit drink. That the conditions of the Intoxication Tank are unsafe a nd life threatening. That the inmates are deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities so as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
75. That the plaintiff was punished by the defendants for refusing to give testimony against Mr. Slack, and that the punishment was performed under the policies and procedures of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees and that the Prosecutors were fully aware of and approved of the use of said punishment in the obtaining of evidence and testimony favorable to their causes.

Civil Rights Title 42 Section 1983 Claim

76. That on September 8^th 1998 at or about 10:30pm, while the plaintiff was sitting at his home at 1452 North Clay St. watching television and enjoying his freedom, liberty, privacy, and immunities of being a free born citizen of the United States of America, Officers Hollie and Shipley knocked on the door and announced that the plaintiff was under arrest.
77. The Plaintiff inquired of the officers what he was being arrested for and the officers said "Trespassing". The officers refused to say where the plaintiff was trespassing, when the trespass occurred, or who filed the complaint. Plaintiff demanded to see the warrant for his arrest and was informed that there was no warrant, and that he was being arrested on a summons. Plaintiff then asked to see the summons and Officer Hollie flipped open his ticket book very quickly so as to prevent the plaintiff from seeing it. Plaintiff insisted on reading the summons, pursuant to the sixth amendment of the Constitution, and Officer Hollie refused. The only information that was given to the plaintiff was that he was being arrested for trespassing and nothing else.
78. The officers, who having real and apparent ability to cause bodily harm, threatened the plaintiff with the use of physical force and laid hands upon the plaintiff and handcuffed his hands behind his back, imprisoning him and, in their official capacity as law enforcement officers, under color of state law, acting within the scope of their employment as agents, servants, and employees of the City, unlawfully arrested the plaintiff, without any legal right to do so.
79. The officers then, without reading the plaintiff his Maranda rights, attempted to question the plaintiff about Mr. Slack. The plaintiff made it clear to the officers that he was not going to answer the officers questions.
80. The officers then, over the objections of the plaintiff, entered the plaintiff's home, and knowing they had no right to do so, conducted an illegal search of his premises.
81. The officers then transported the plaintiff to the city jail where he was booked. The plaintiff continued to assert his sixth amendment right to be informed of the charges against him and was denied any further information. The plaintiff was again searched against his will and his wallet removed containing over $200 in cash.
82. The plaintiff was then imprisoned in the intoxication tank by the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, and that they intended to confine the plaintiff, and that the confinement and imprisonment was without the plaintiff's permission or consent, and that the plaintiff was aware of his imprisonment, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged.
83. The conditions of said Intoxication Tank were so substandard as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
84. The defendants, their agents, servants, and employees denied the plaintiff the right to make a telephone call and denied the plaintiff the opportunity to make bail. That the plaintiff had on his person at the jail in cash over $200, and that the bond was $100, and that the defendants had actual knowledge that the plaintiff had funds on his person to make bond, and that the defendants knowingly, deliberately, unlawfully, and maliciously denied the plaintiff the opportunity to make bond.
85. That after about 15 minutes after the plaintiff was imprisoned in the drunk tank, Officer Hollie held the ticket briefly up to the glass window, however, the plaintiff still couldn't read it. Officer Hollie offered the plaintiff one last chance to talk and the plaintiff refused to do so. The plaintiff was then left in the intoxication tank for ten hours until the next morning.
86. Based upon information and belief, that the arrest, search, imprisonment, and prosecution of the plaintiff was executed under the direction and approval of the Prosecutors, knowing that the procedures were reckless, malicious, illegal and improper, for the purpose of obtaining evidence and testimony for use in their case against Mr. Slack, and that at all times the Prosecutors will fully informed of the police activities against the plaintiff as well as the improper and illegal nature of said acts, and allowed and encouraged and assisted in the concealment and coverup of said illegal activities.
87. That as a result of the accusations made by the defendant, their agents, servants, and employees, acting under their employment and within the scope of their authority, made falsely, publicly, wickedly, and maliciously, the plaintiff was compelled to appear in Municipal Court and appear before a judge to answer these fabricated charges, and to be arraigned, and to be falsely charged with the crime of trespassing. And that the defendants continued criminal proceedings against the plaintiff without probable cause and with actual malice, and that the proceedings were terminated in favor of the plaintiff.
88. That the arrest, search, imprisonment, and prosecution were not justified by probable cause or any other legal privilege and that the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, acted under the color of statute, ordinances, regulation, and customs and usages of the State of Missouri, County of Greene, and City of Springfield, and in their capacity as police officers for the Springfield Police Department.
89. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
90. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees failed to properly hire, retain, train, supervise, discipline, or in any other way control the behavior or performance of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees and in their hiring practices in the exercise of their police functions and their failure to enforce the laws of the State of Missouri and the United States of America, is evidence of the reckless lack of cautious regard for the rights of the public including the plaintiff, and exhibited a lack of degree of due care which prudent and reasonable individuals would show in the execution of their duties.
91. That the failure of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees to hire, train, supervise, discipline, or in any other way control the defendants in their duties, was carried out willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and with such reckless disregard for the consequences as to display a conscious disregard for the dangers of harm and injury to the citizens of the City of Springfield including the plaintiff.
92. That the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees permitted and encouraged the use of policy and/or drafted policy and/or created government customs, whether written or unwritten, that were violative of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff; and, in each and all acts of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees herein were done not as individuals, but under the color of state law.
93. The Plaintiff did not commit the illegal act for which he was charged, either before or at the time he was falsely arrested, searched, imprisoned, maliciously prosecuted, and deprived of his liberty and freedom and his constitutional rights.
94. That although the Greene County Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from certain civil rights violations, immunity does not extend to acts that are not duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process. The Prosecutors would not be immune from conspiring with the police to encourage them to obtain information and evidence by illegal and unconstitutional means and in ways that knowingly violate the civil rights of witnesses or third parties such as the plaintiff. (Plaintiff was prosecuted for trespassing by Penny Melton, a city prosecutor, who is not a party to this action due to absolute immunity.)
95. A systematic pattern of conduct exists consisting of a large number of acts of violence, illegal arrests, illegal searches and seizures, intimidation, torture, assaults, batteries, and other illegal acts of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, and that the City and the Prosecutors have used these customs to their advantage to persecute the citizens of Springfield and that these illegal acts are actually encouraged and that the Internal Affairs department actively conceals the police misconduct, and that the Prosecutors knowing that a pattern of police misconduct exists, knowingly takes advantage of said misconduct in the prosecution of citizens. That the culture of the City of Springfield is to coverup for misconduct and that the true rule is that "you have to go along to get along."
96. Upon information and belief that the City has taken no remedial action to correct the problems herein and that the Internal Affairs Department continues to conceal the misconduct of the officers, and that the officers have not been investigated, and that the officers have not been punished, and the officers have not been charged with criminal conduct nor have they been suspended, punished, or retrained in any way, and that the officers are still employed by the Springfield Police Department. The Prosecutors continue to use the police misconduct to obtain evidence, whether true or false, and to charge citizens with crimes they know they didn't commit. And that the improper and illegal government behavior is both pervasive and persistent.
97. That the unlawful and illegal conduct of the defendants, their agents, servants, and employees and each of them acting under color of law deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional right to be secure in his person and his effects against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and, the right of the plaintiff to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations against him pursuant to the Sixth Amendment; and, the right of the plaintiff to not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and, the right to be free of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment; and, that the plaintiff was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.

That be reason of the false arrest, illegal search, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution that the plaintiff was subjected to great indignities, humiliation, ridicule, public embarrassment, shame, loss of employment and work opportunities, loss of hundreds of hours of his productive time, loss of sleep, and to experience paranoia, depression, anxiety, and helplessness. The plaintiff is shocked and mortified the City stands by as their police officers are permitted to drag citizens out of their home in the middle of the night without a warrant, and the City, knowing that it's occurring and knowing that it's illegal, permits and encourages such activity. This knowledge, that the City condones this behavior has caused the plaintiff mental distress and psychological damage. That because of the illegal acts of the defendant, their agents, servants, and employees, that the plaintiff's political career was damaged resulting in a reduced chance of him being elec ted to office in his bid to run for congress, and that his future political career is damaged.

By reason of the aforesaid, the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $2,000,000.

The defendants, their agents, servants, and employees have shown and continue to show contempt for the rule of law and the constitutional rights of the citizens of Springfield Missouri. The defendants act as though they are above the law and the constitution doesn't apply to them and therefore they can abuse the citizens and the plaintiff, subjecting the citizens to great indignities and humiliation, pain and distress in both mind and body, scorn, ridicule, arrest, torture, imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slander, libel, and other abuses as if the laws don't apply to them. The City uses the courts to charge victims of police abuse with crimes so as to cover up for the city's police misconduct and to use the courts as a weapon of terror and intimidation to prevent people like the plaintiff from bringing suit for damages against the city.

A culture of police misconduct and misconduct of prosecutors is detrimental to society. This kind of conduct, which is permitted and encouraged by the City, makes it harder for the good hard working honest police officers to do their jobs. It puts cops at risk from angry citizens. It allows criminals to go free when their illegal methods are exposed. And it undermines the rule of law and respect for government. In the case of ELKINS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 the court in speaking about the imperative of judicial integrity stated:

Plaintiff believes that this same statement applies not only to the imperative of judicial integrity, but to the integrity of the City of Springfield, the Greene County Prosecutor, and the Springfield Police Department as well. The City, its agents, servants, and employees seem to have decided that they are above the rule of law and that the Constitution is some kind of Washington thing and doesn't apply to Springfield Missouri. The City has a well established a protective culture and set of unwritten customs of covering up and concealing the misconduct of each other and punishing and persecuting those who would expose their wanton and wicked deeds. Punitive damages are appropriate where the state has maliciously, repeatedly, and pervasively violated the civil rights of citizens, and are to be used as a deterrent to punish the offender so as to stop the offender, and as an example to other cities to discourage similar behavior. The Plaintiff believes that the City will not change its behavior unless it is made to suffer significant punishment.

By reason of the aforesaid, plaintiff asks for punitive damages in the sum of $5,000,000.

Plaintiff asks that the court find that the culture of corruption and illegal conduct in Springfield Missouri, and specifically of the Springfield Police Department is so pervasive and persistent that the City can not be trusted to fix it and that the Court make a finding and ask that the United States Justice Department step in as it did in the city of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania and to turn control of the Springfield Police Department to the federal government in order to reestablish the rule of law and respect for the constitutional rights of the people.

Plaintiff asks for an order of the court that the City take the necessary steps to make repairs to the Intoxication Tank and to institute policies and procedures for the cleaning and maintenance of said tank so as to comply with health department standards and other standards of correctional facilities so as to comply with federal and state standards.

One of the main issues in this suit will be the application of sovereign immunity and damages, especially punitive damages. One of the standards that defeats sovereign immunity is if the acts rise to the level of "shocks the conscious". In this case it is indisputable that the plaintiff was arrested in his home without a warrant on a minor charge and without exigent circumstances. It would appear that not only did the officers not know that you can't arrest someone in their home without a warrant, but his Sergeant, the Internal Affairs Department, the Chief of Police, the Prosecutors, the City Manager, and the City Council, three of whom are lawyers, also don't know that you can't arrest someone in their home without a warrant. The fact that these people don't know when you can or can not make an arrest shocks the conscious. It certainly shocks the plaintiff's conscious.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Title 42 USC Section 1988. Since punitive damages are appropriate, counsel fees, internet access fees, computer and office equipment, paralegal fees and litigation fees can be taken into consideration when estimating the foregoing punitive damages.

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.

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Marc Perkel - Plaintiff - 12-14-98